[7,55] Διεξιὼν δὲ ταῦτα μετὰ πολλῶν δακρύων οὐ προσποιητῶν καὶ πεπλασμένων, ἀλλ´ ἀληθινῶν, ἀνὴρ ἡλικίας τε καὶ ἀρετῆς ἀξιώσει προὔχων, ὡς ἔμαθε κινούμενον ἐπὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις τὸ συνέδριον, ἐκ τοῦ τεθαρρηκότος ἤδη τὸ λοιπὸν ἐξύφαινε τῶν λόγων· Εἰ δέ τινες ὑμῶν, ὦ βουλευταί, λέγων, ταράττονται δοκοῦντες ἔθος εἰσάγειν πονηρὸν εἰς τὴν πόλιν, ἐὰν τῷ δήμῳ συγχωρήσητε ψῆφον ἐπιφέρειν κατὰ τῶν πατρικίων, καὶ ἐπ´ οὐδενὶ ἀγαθῷ νομίζουσι τὴν τῶν δημάρχων ἐξουσίαν πολλὴν ἰσχὺν λαβοῦσαν γενήσεσθαι, μαθέτωσαν ἁμαρτάνοντες τῆς δόξης καὶ τἀναντία ἢ προσῆκεν ὑπειληφότες. εἰ γάρ τι καὶ ἄλλο σωτηρίας αἴτιον ἔσται τῇ πόλει τῇδε καὶ τοῦ μηδέποτε τὴν ἐλευθερίαν μηδὲ τὴν ἰσχὺν ἀφαιρεθῆναι, ὁμονοοῦσαν δ´ ἀεὶ καὶ μιᾷ γνώμῃ περὶ πάντων χρωμένην διατελεῖν, ὁ δῆμος αἰτιώτατος ἔσται συμπαραληφθεὶς ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα· καὶ τὸ μὴ μίαν εἶναι τὴν διοικοῦσαν τὰ κοινὰ πολιτείαν ἄκρατον μήτε μοναρχίαν μήτ´ ὀλιγαρχίαν μήτε δημοκρατίαν, ἀλλὰ τὴν μικτὴν ἐξ ἁπασῶν τούτων κατάστασιν, τοῦτο ὑπὲρ ἅπαντα ἡμᾶς ὠφελήσει. ῥᾷστα γὰρ εἰς ὕβρεις ἀποσκήπτει καὶ παρανομίας τούτων ἕκαστον τῶν πολιτευμάτων αὐτὸ καθ´ ἑαυτὸ γινόμενον, ὅταν δ´ ἀνακερασθῇ πάντα μετρίως, τὸ παρακινοῦν μέρος αἰεὶ καὶ ἐκβαῖνον ἐκ τοῦ συνήθους κόσμου ὑπὸ τοῦ σωφρονοῦντος καὶ μένοντος ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις ἤθεσι κατείργεται. μοναρχία μὲν ὠμὴ καὶ αὐθάδης γενηθεῖσα καὶ τυραννικὰ διώκειν ἀρξαμένη ζηλώματα ὑπ´ ἀνδρῶν ὀλίγων καὶ ἀγαθῶν καταλύεται. ὀλιγαρχία δ´ ἐκ τῶν ἀρίστων ἀνδρῶν συνεστηκυῖα, ᾗ χρῆσθε καὶ ὑμεῖς νυνί, ὅταν πλούτῳ καὶ ἑταιρίαις ἐπαρθεῖσα δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς μηθένα ποιῆται λόγον, ὑπὸ δήμου φρονίμου καταλύεται. δῆμος δὲ σωφρονῶν καὶ κατὰ νόμους πολιτευόμενος ὅταν ἀκοσμεῖν ἄρξηται καὶ παρανομεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ κρατίστου ἀνδρὸς βίᾳ καταληφθεὶς δικαιοῦται. ὑμῖν δ´, ὦ βουλή, μονάρχου μὲν ἐξουσίας, ἵνα μὴ τυραννὶς γένηται, τὰ δυνατὰ εὕρηται βοηθήματα. δύο τε γὰρ ἀνθ´ ἑνὸς ἀποδείξαντες τῆς πόλεως κυρίους καὶ τούτοις οὐκ ἀόριστον χρόνον ἐπιτρέψαντες ἔχειν τὴν ἀρχήν, ἀλλ´ ἐνιαύσιον οὐδὲν ἧττον ἀποδείκνυτε φύλακας αὐτῶν τριακοσίους ἄνδρας ἐκ τῶν πατρικίων τοὺς κρατίστους τε καὶ πρεσβυτάτους, ἐξ ὧν ἥδε ἡ βουλὴ συνέστηκεν· ὑμῶν δ´ αὐτῶν, ἵνα μένητε ἐν τῷ προσήκοντι κόσμῳ, φυλακὴν οὐδεμίαν ἄχρι τοῦδε φαίνεσθε πεποιημένοι. καὶ περὶ μὲν ὑμῶν οὔπω ἔδεισα, μὴ διαφθαρῆτε τὰς διανοίας ὑπό τε μεγέθους καὶ πλήθους ἀγαθῶν, οἳ τυραννίδος τε πολυχρονίου ἠλευθερώκατε τὴν πόλιν ἔναγχος καὶ οὔπω σχολὴν ἐσχήκατε ὑβρίζειν καὶ τρυφᾶν διὰ τοὺς συνεχεῖς καὶ μακροὺς πολέμους· περὶ δὲ τῶν μεθ´ ὑμᾶς ἐσομένων ἐνθυμούμενος ὅσας ὁ μακρὸς αἰὼν φέρει μεταβολὰς δέδοικα, μή τι παρακινήσαντες οἱ δυνατοὶ οἱ ἐκ τοῦ συνεδρίου λάθωσιν εἰς μοναρχίαν τὸ πολίτευμα περιστήσαντες τυραννικήν.

[7,55] When he had related all these evils with many tears — tears that were not feigned and affected, but genuine — this man who was eminent for the dignity both of his years and of his merits, perceiving that the senate was moved by his words, proceeded then with confidence to deliver the remainder of his speech. "If any of you, senators," he said, "are disturbed by the thought that you will be introducing a pernicious custom into the commonwealth if you grant the populace the power of giving their votes against the patricians, and entertain an opinion that the tribunician power, if considerably strengthened, will serve no good purpose, let them learn that their opinion is erroneous and their surmise is the opposite of what it should be. For if anything is going to be the means of preserving this commonwealth and insuring that she shall never be deprived of her liberty or her power, but shall ever continue to be united and harmonious in all respects, the most effective instrument will be the populace if taken as partners in the administration of affairs; and what will benefit us above everything will be, not to have a simple and unmixed form of government administering the state, whether monarchy, oligarchy, or democracy, but a constitution combined out of all of these. For each of these forms by itself alone very easily ends in wantonness and lawlessness; but when all of them (p309) are duly combined, the element which is inclined at any time to make innovations and to overstep the customary bounds is held in check by the element which is self- restrained and remains true to its own character. Thus monarchy, when it becomes cruel and insolent and begins to pursue tyrannical measures, is overthrown by a few good men. And an oligarchy composed of the best men, which is your present form of government, when it has become elated by reason of its wealth and its bands of partisans, and pays no regard to justice or to any other virtue, is overthrown by a prudent democracy. And when a democracy that is moderate and governs in accordance with laws begins to be disorderly and lawless, it is taken in hand by the strongest man and set right by force. You, senators, have devised all the precautions possible to prevent the monarchical power from degenerating into tyranny, for you have invested two men instead of one with the supreme power of the commonwealth, and though you have entrusted this magistracy to them, not for an indefinite time, but only for a year, you nevertheless appoint, to keep watch over them, three hundred patricians, at once the best and the oldest, of whom this senate is composed. But you do not seem as yet to have appointed any to watch over you yourselves, to insure your remaining within proper bounds. Now as for you, I have no fear so far that you will permit your minds to be corrupted by the magnitude and number of your blessings, since you have only recently delivered the commonwealth from a long tyranny and because of the long and continuous wars have not yet had leisure to grow insolent and wanton. But with regard to (p311) your successors, when I consider how great changes the long course of time brings with it, I am afraid that the men of power in the senate may introduce some change and, unnoticed, transform the government into a tyrannical monarchy.