[3,85] ὥστε ὁ φιλόπονος καὶ ἐγκρατὴς οὐ μόνον βασιλεύειν ἱκανώτερός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἥδιον βιοτεύει πολὺ τῶν ἐναντίων. {ἐγρηγόρσεως δὲ καὶ ὕπνου τοῖς μὲν στρατιώταις ἐξ ἴσου μέτεστι, τῶν μὲν φυλαττόντων ἐν μέρει, τῶν δὲ ἀναπαυομένων· ὁ δὲ στρατηγὸς ἀγρυπνότερός ἐστι τῶν ἀεὶ φυλαττόντων.} { καὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἀφεκτέον καὶ γαστρὶ καὶ ὕπνῳ καὶ ἀφροδισίοις ἐλάχιστα προσεκτέον, {ἢ τῷ φιλουμένῳ μὲν ὑπὸ πάντων, μηδένα δὲ ἔχοντι ἐπιβουλεύοντα.} (86) φιλίαν γε μὴν ἁπάντων νενόμικε τῶν αὑτοῦ κτημάτων κάλλιστον καὶ ἱερώτατον. οὐ γὰρ οὕτως αἰσχρὸν εἶναι {τὸ βασιλεύειν} οὐδὲ ἐπικίνδυνον χρημάτων ἀπορεῖν ὡς φίλων, οὐδ´ ἂν οὕτως τῇ χορηγίᾳ καὶ τοῖς στρατοπέδοις καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ δυνάμει διαφυλάττειν (87) τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὡς τῇ πίστει τῶν φίλων. μόνος μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς πρὸς οὐδὲν οὐδὲ τῶν ἰδίων ἱκανός ἐστι· τοῖς δὲ βασιλεῦσιν ὅσῳ πλείω τε καὶ μείζω πράττειν ἀνάγκη, πλειόνων δεῖ καὶ τῶν συνεργούντων καὶ μετ´ εὐνοίας πλείονος. ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὰ μέγιστα καὶ σπουδαιότατα τῶν πραγμάτων ἢ πιστεύειν ἑτέροις ἢ προΐεσθαι. (88) καὶ τοίνυν τοῖς μὲν ἰδιώταις οἱ νόμοι παρέχουσι τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι ῥᾳδίως ὑπὸ τούτων οἷς ἂν συμβάλωσιν ἢ χρήματα πιστεύσαντες ἢ οἶκον ἐπιτρέψαντες ἢ ἔργου τινὸς κοινωνήσαντες, ζημιοῦντες τὸν ἀδικοῦντα· τοῖς δὲ βασιλεῦσι τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι πιστεύσαντας οὐκ ἔστι παρὰ τῶν νόμων ζητεῖν, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τῆς εὐνοίας. (89) καὶ γὰρ ἰσχυροτάτους μὲν εἰκὸς ἁπάντων εἶναι τοὺς ἐγγὺς τῶν βασιλέων καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν συνδιοικοῦντας. ἀπὸ δὲ τούτων οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλη φυλακὴ πλὴν τὸ ἀγαπᾶσθαι· καὶ τοῖς μὲν τυχοῦσιν οὐκ ἀσφαλὲς εἰκῇ μεταδιδόναι δυνάμεως, ὅσῳ δ´ ἄν τις τοὺς φίλους ἰσχυροτέρους ποιῇ, τοσούτῳ ἰσχυρότερος αὐτὸς γίγνεται.

[3,85] Consequently, he who loves to toil and exercices self-control is not only better qualified to be king but is able to live a much more pleasant life th an those in the opposite case. (86) Friendship, moreover, the good king holds to be the fairest and most sacred of his possessions, believing that the lack of means is not so shameful or perilous for a king as the lack of friends, and that he maintains his happy state, not so much by means of revenues and armies and his other sources of strength, as by the loyalty of his friends. For no one, of and by himself, is sufficient for a single one of even his own needs ; and the more and greater the responsibilities of a king are, the greater is the number of co-workers that he needs, and the greater the loyalty required of them, since he is forced to entrust his greatest and most important interests to others or else to abandon them. Furthermore, the law protects the private individual from being easily wronged by men with whom he enters into business relations, either by entrusting them with money, or by making them agents of an estate, or by entering into partnership with them in some enterprise ; and it does so by punishing the offender. A king, however, cannot look to the law for protection against betrayal of a trust, but must depend upon loyalty. Naturally, those who stand near the king and help him rule the country are the strongest, and from them he has no other protection than their love. Consequently, it is not a safe policy for him to share his power carelessly with the first men he meets ; but the stronger he makes his friends, the stronger he becomes himself.