[3,10] τίνι μὲν γὰρ δεῖ πλείονος φρονήσεως ἢ τῷ βουλευομένῳ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων; τίνι δὲ ἀκριβεστέρας δικαιοσύνης ἢ τῷ μείζονι τῶν νόμων; τίνι δὲ σωφροσύνης ἐγκρατεστέρας ἢ ὅτῳ πάντα ἔξεστι; τίνι δὲ ἀνδρείας ἰσχυροτέρας ἢ ὑφ´ οὗ πάντα σῴζεται; (11) τίνα δὲ μᾶλλον εὐφραίνει τὰ ἔργα τῆς ἀρετῆς ἢ τὸν σύμπαντας ἀνθρώπους θεατὰς καὶ μάρτυρας ἔχοντα τῆς αὑτοῦ ψυχῆς; ὥστε μήποτε πράξαντι μηδὲν οἷόν τε λαθεῖν, οὐ μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ ἡλίῳ πορεύεσθαι διὰ σκότους· πάντα γὰρ τἄλλα ἀναφαίνων πρῶτον ἑαυτὸν ἐπιδείκνυσι. (12) λέγω δὲ ταῦτα οὐκ ἀγνοῶν ὅτι τὰ ῥηθέντα νῦν ὑπ´ ἐμοῦ ἐν πλείονι χρόνῳ ἀνάγκη λέγεσθαι· ἀλλ´ οὐκ ἔστι δέος μήποτε ἐγὼ φανῶ τι κολακείᾳ λέγων. (13) οὐ γὰρ ὀλίγην οὐδὲ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ δέδωκα βάσανον τῆς ἐλευθερίας. εἰ δὲ ἐγὼ πρότερον μέν, ὅτε πᾶσιν ἀναγκαῖον ἐδόκει ψεύδεσθαι διὰ φόβον, μόνος ἀληθεύειν ἐτόλμων, καὶ ταῦτα κινδυνεύων ὑπὲρ τῆς ψυχῆς, νῦν δέ, ὅτε πᾶσιν ἔξεστι τἀληθῆ λέγειν, ψεύδομαι, μηδενὸς κινδύνου παρεστῶτος, οὐκ ἂν εἰδείην οὔτε παρρησίας οὔτε κολακείας καιρόν. (14) καίτοι σύμπαντες οἱ πράττοντες ὁτιοῦν ἑκόντες ἢ χρημάτων ἕνεκα πράττουσιν ἢ δόξης ἢ δι´ ἡδονήν τινα ἄλλην ἢ λοιπὸν οἶμαι δι´ ἀρετὴν καὶ τὸ καλὸν αὐτὸ τιμῶντες.

[3,10] Who, in fact, must exercise greater wisdom than he who is concerned with the weightiest matters ; who, a keener sense of justice than he who is above the law; who, a more rigorous self-control than he to whom all things are permissible ; who, a stouter courage than he upon whom the safety of everything depends? And who takes greater delight in the works of virtue than he who has all men as spectators and witnesses of his own soul ?—so that nothing he may do can ever be hidden any more than the sun can run its course in darkness ; for, in bringing all other things to light, it reveals itself first. (12) These things I say in the full knowledge that my present statements will have to be repeated at greater length; and yet there is no danger of my appearing to speak aught in flattery, since I have given no slight nor fleeting evidence of my sincerity. If, in bygone days when fear made everyone think falsehood a necessity, I was the only one bold enough to tell the truth even at the peril of my life, and yet am lying now when all may speak the truth without incurring danger—then I could not possibly know the time for either frankness or flattery. (14) Again, all who act deliberately do so either for money, for reputation, or for some pleasurable end, or else, I suppose, for virtue's sake and because they honour goodness itself.