[208] οὔσης. ἔκκλητοι δὲ ὥσπερ ἔφεσις ἐκ δημοτῶν εἰς δικαστήριον σὺν οὐκ ἐλάττονι τῶν δεξαμένων φόβῳ περὶ τῆς κρίσεως ἢ τῶν ποιουμένων γίγνονται. ὥστε φαίη τις ἂν τοσαῦτα ἄρχεσθαι τοὺς νῦν ὑπὸ τῶν πεμπομένων, ὁπόσα ἂν αὐτοῖς ἀρέσκῃ. πῶς οὖν ταῦτα οὐκ ἐν τοῖς ἐπέκεινα πάσης δημοκρατίας; οὔκουν ἐκεῖ ἔξεστι μετὰ τὴν ἐν τῇ πόλει ψῆφον ἐνεχθεῖσαν ἐλθεῖν ἄλλοσε οὐδ´ ἐπ´ ἄλλους δικαστὰς, ἀλλὰ στέργειν ἀνάγκη τοῖς ἐγνωσμένοις, εἰ μή τις ἐστὶ μικρὰ πόλις, ὥστε προσδεῖσθαι δικαστῶν ὑπερορίων παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν, ἢ καὶ διώκοντα μὴ κρατήσαντα, μηδὲ τῷ νενικῆσθαι· ἀλλὰ μένει δικαστὴς ἕτερος μέγας, ὃν οὔποτε οὐδὲν ἐκφεύγει τῶν δικαίων· κἀνταῦθα δὴ πολλὴ καὶ εὐσχήμων ἰσότης μικροῦ πρὸς μέγαν καὶ ἀδόξου πρὸς ἔνδοξον καὶ πένητος δὴ πρὸς πλούσιον καὶ γενναῖον ἀγεννοῦς, καὶ τὸ τοῦ Ἡσιόδου συμβαίνει, Ῥεῖα μὲν γὰρ βριάει, ῥέα δὲ βριάοντα χαλέπτει οὗτος ὁ δικαστής τε καὶ ἡγεμὼν, ὅπως ἂν τὸ δίκαιον ἄγῃ, ὥσπερ πνεῦμα ἐν νηὶ, οὐ δή που πλουσίῳ μὲν μᾶλλον, πένητι δὲ ἧττον χαριζόμενόν τε καὶ παραπέμπον, ἀλλ´ ὅτῳ γένοιτο ἀεὶ, τοῦτον ὁμοίως ὠφελοῦν. Δίειμι δὴ καὶ τὰ Ἑλληνικὰ, ἐπειδήπερ ἐνταῦθα ἐγενόμην τοῦ λόγου, αἰσχυνόμενος μὲν καὶ δεδιὼς μὴ δόξω μικρολογεῖσθαι. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ´, ὅπερ ἀρτίως εἶπον, οὐκ ἴσα ἴσοις παραβάλλων δίειμι, ἀλλ´ οὐκ ὄντων ἑτέρων παραδειγμάτων ἀναγκάζομαι τοῖς οὖσι χρῆσθαι. εἶτα καὶ γελοῖον τοῦτο μὲν αὐτὸ θαυμάζειν καὶ δεικνύειν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν εὑρεῖν ἴσα τοῖς ὑμετέροις ἕτερα οὐδ´ ἐγγὺς, ἀλλὰ πάντα ὑπὸ τούτων ἀποκρύπτεται, περιμένειν δὲ τηνικαῦτα παρεξετάσαι, ὁπηνίκα ἴσων ἔχοιμεν μνημονεῦσαι, οὐκ οἶμαί γε δεῖν, ὅτι γε οὐδὲ θαυμαστὰ ὁμοίως ἂν ἦν, εἴ τινα εἴχομεν εἰπεῖν ὅμοια.

[208] Just as cases are appealed from a district court to a jury, imperial officials have to answer to an appellate tribunal, where they are no safer from an adverse verdict than the appellants. You might say that people are now ruled by the legate only as much as they please. Is not this better than any democracy? Under democracy, once a man's case is decided in his town, he cannot take it elsewhere or to other judges; he must be content with that verdict, unless it is some small town that has to call in outside judges. . . . {Under the Roman Empire, neither the plaintif nor the defendant need submit to an unjust decision.} Another great judge remains from whom justice is never hidden. At that bar there is profound and impressive equity between small and great, obscure and eminent, poor and rich, noble and common. The line from Hesiod applies to this judge and ruler: For him, it is easy to strengthen, and easy to chastise the strong, whichever way justice may direct, like a breeze on a ship's sails, which does not favor and convoy the rich more than the poor, but impartially helps whoever comes its way. Now I shall turn to Greek history, since I have reached that point in my speech. I am ashamed and afraid that I shall give the impression of triviality. However, as I said a while ago, I shall not set this forth as as comparison of equals to equals; I am forced by lack of other illustrations to use what there is. Furthermore, it would be silly for us to admire and call attention to this very point — that no other glories can be found equal or nearly equal to yours, which blot them all out — if we were nevertheless to put of making a contrast until we could refer to something equally glorious. I think we ought not to put it off, for Rome would not be so admirable if we could name anything like it.