[4,40] ἢ οὐ τὸ ὀαρίζειν ὁμιλεῖν ἐστιν; οὐκοῦν ὁμιλητὴν τοῦ Διός φησιν αὐτὸν εἶναι, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἔφη μαθητήν. ἆρ´ οὖν ὑπὲρ ἄλλων αὐτὸν οἴει {μανθάνειν τε καὶ} ὁμιλεῖν τῷ Διὶ πραγμάτων ἢ τῶν δικαίων καὶ βασιλικῶν; ἐπεί τοι καὶ (41) λέγεται δικαιότατος ὁ Μίνως πάντων γενέσθαι. πάλιν δὲ ὅταν λέγῃ διοτρεφεῖς τοὺς βασιλέας καὶ διιφίλους, ἄλλο τι οἴει λέγειν αὐτὸν τὴν τροφὴν ταύτην, ἢ {ἣν ἔφη εἶναι} διδασκαλίαν καὶ μαθητείαν; ἢ σὺ οἴει λέγειν αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ Διὸς τοὺς βασιλέας τρέφεσθαι ὥσπερ ὑπὸ τίτθης γάλακτι καὶ οἴνῳ καὶ σιτίοις, ἀλλ´ οὐκ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ (42) ἀληθείᾳ; ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ φιλίαν {οὐκ} ἄλλην ἢ τὸ ταὐτὰ βούλεσθαι καὶ διανοεῖσθαι, ὁμόνοιάν τινα οὖσαν; οὕτως γὰρ δήπου καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δοκοῦσιν οἱ φίλοι πάντων μάλιστα ὁμονοεῖν καὶ μὴ (43) διαφέρεσθαι περὶ μηδενός. ὃς ἂν οὖν τῷ Διὶ φίλος ᾖ καὶ ὁμονοῇ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον, ἔσθ´ ὅπως ἀδίκου τινὸς ἐπιθυμήσει πράγματος ἢ πονηρόν τι καὶ αἰσχρὸν διανοηθήσεται; αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο ἔοικε δηλοῦν (44) καὶ ὅταν ἐγκωμιάζων τινὰ λέγῃ τῶν βασιλέων ‘ποιμένα λαῶν’. τοῦ γὰρ ποιμένος οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἔργον ἢ πρόνοια καὶ σωτηρία καὶ φυλακὴ προβάτων. καίτοι ἐνίοτε πολλὰ πρόβατα ἐλαύνει μάγειρος εἷς ὠνησάμενος ὥστε κατακόπτειν {οὐ μὰ Δία} καὶ σφάττειν καὶ δέρειν. ἀλλὰ πλεῖστον διαφέρει μαγειρική τε καὶ ποιμενική, σχεδὸν ὅσον βασιλεία τε καὶ τυραννίς.

[4,40] Or does not ` to consort ' mean ` to associate ' ? Well then, he says that he was an associate of Zeus, which would virtually be calling him his disciple. Now do you imagine that he associated with Zeus as a pupil with any other object than to learn justice and the duties of a king ? For mark you, Minos is said to have been the most righteous man in the world. Once more, when he says that kings are ` nurtured of Zeus ' and ` dear unto Zeus,' do you think that he means any other nurture than the teaching and instruction which I called divine ? Or do you believe that he means that kings are nourished by Zeus as by a nurse, on milk and wine and various foods, and not on knowledge and truth? And in the same way he means that friendship also is nothing else than identity of wish and of purpose, that is, a kind of likemindedness. For this, I presume, is the view of the world too : that friends are most truly likeminded and are at variance in nothing. Can anyone, therefore, who is a friend of Zeus and is likeminded with him by any possibility conceive any unrighteous desire or design what is wicked and disgraceful ? Homer seems to answer this very question clearly also when in commending some king he calls him a `shepherd of peoples.' For the shepherd's business is simply to oversee, guard, and protect flocks, not, by heavens, to slaughter, butcher, and skin them. It is true that at times a shepherd, like a butcher, buys and drives off many sheep ; but there is a world of difference between the functions of butcher and shepherd, practically the same as between monarchy and tyranny.