[31,30] καίτοι τοῦτο οὐ μόνον ἐκείνους ἀδικουμένους καὶ δεινὰ πάσχοντας, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν πρόφασιν δείκνυσι κενήν, δι´ ἣν ἴσως ὑμᾶς τινες ἀξιώσουσι τοῦτο ποιεῖν, μᾶλλον δὲ κατὰ τοῦ πράγματος οὖσαν. εἰ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον ἅμα καὶ συμφέρον φήσουσιν εἶναι τὸ ἑτέρους τιμᾶν, πῶς οὐχ ὑπεναντίον ἐστὶ τούτῳ τοὺς πρότερον οὕτω τετιμημένους ὑβρίζειν; ὃ γὰρ τῶν πρότερόν τις οὐκ ἂν εἵλετο λαβεῖν, εἰδὼς τοῦτο ἐσόμενον, πῶς εἰκός ἐστι τῶν νῦν τινα ἡδέως λαμβάνειν ὁρῶντα τὸ γιγνόμενον; ὥστ´ εἰ μὴ καὶ δι´ ἐκείνους τοὺς θᾶττον εὐεργέτας, ἀλλὰ τούτους γε, οὓς νῦν τιμῶμεν, εἰκὸς ἦν φυλάξασθαι τὸ πρᾶγμα. (31,31) πάντες μὲν γὰρ ὑπόπτως ἔχουσι πρὸς τὰ ὑπὸ τούτων διδόμενα οὓς ἴσασι τῶν πρότερόν {τινα} ἐπαινεθέντων καὶ δοξάντων φίλων οὕτως ἀμελοῦντας, μάλιστα δὲ οἱ τῶν αὐτῶν τυγχάνοντες, ὧν τοὺς εἰληφότας ὁρῶσιν ἀπεστερημένους. εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ ὅπως αὐτοὶ λάβωσι τοῦτο γίγνοιτο, μᾶλλον δὲ ὅπως δοκῶσιν εἰληφέναι, παντελῶς ἤδη τὸ πρᾶγμα εἰρωνείαν καὶ χλεύην νομίζουσιν. πολὺ δὲ βέλτιον ἦν λέγειν τοῖς βουλομένοις {ποιῆσαι} μικρὰ φροντίζειν ὑμᾶς τῶν τάχιον τετιμημένων, ὅτι μηκέτι μηδεμία χρεία τοῦ τιμᾶν τινά ἐστιν, ἢ τοὐναντίον οὗ τὴν μεγίστην φασὶν εἶναι τῇ πόλει χρείαν καὶ πρὸς πλείονας νῦν ἢ πρότερον, τοῦτο διαβάλλειν. (31,32) καίτοι μὰ τὸν Δία καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς οὐδ´ εἰ τὴν ἀνωτάτην χάριν ὑμῖν ἕξειν ἔμελλον οἱ δοκοῦντες νῦν τῶν εἰκόνων τυγχάνειν καὶ σφόδρα ἐπαινέσειν τὸν δῆμον, οὐδ´ οὕτως ἐχρῆν αὐτὸ γίγνεσθαι. τὸ γὰρ μόνον ζητεῖν ἐξ ὧν ἄν τις ἀρέσαι τινὰ ποιήσας καὶ προσαγάγοιτο, εἰ δ´ ἄλλον ὃν οὐ προσῆκεν ἀδικήσει τοῦτο ποιῶν ἢ καθόλου τι μὴ δέον πράξει μὴ σκοπεῖν, οὔτε μὰ τοὺς θεοὺς ἐλευθέρων ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπων οὔτε μετρίων τὸ ἦθος. οὐδεὶς γὰρ οὐδὲ τῶν πάνυ πονηρῶν προαιρεῖταί τι φαῦλον, ὃ μὴ συμφέρειν ἑαυτῷ νομίζει πρὸς τὸ παρόν, ἀλλ´ ἔστιν αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἡ μοχθηρία τὸ κέρδους ἕνεκα καὶ χρείας μηδενὸς αἰσχροῦ μηδὲ ἀδίκου πράγματος ἐπιστρέφεσθαι μηδὲ φροντίζειν ποῖον τὸ γιγνόμενον, ἀλλὰ μόνον εἰ λυσιτελές. (31,33) οὐκοῦν ὁ τὸν μὲν παρόντα θεραπεύων, ὀλιγωρῶν δὲ τοῦ θᾶττον φίλου, καὶ τῆς μὲν γεγενημένης χρείας ἐπιλελησμένος, τὴν δ´ ἐλπιζομένην ὠφέλειαν περὶ πλείστου ποιούμενος, ἆρ´ οὐκ ἴστε ἧστινος τυγχάνει προσηγορίας; οὐ κόλαξ ὁ τοιοῦτος ὀνομάζεται παρὰ πᾶσιν; οὐκ ἀγεννής, οὐκ ἄπιστος δοκεῖ; νῦν τοίνυν οὐδὲ τοῦτο περιγίγνεται τῇ πόλει, τὸ θεραπεύεσθαί τινας ὑπὸ αὐτῆς καὶ μεγάλου τινὸς οἴεσθαι τυγχάνειν ὧν ἂν τὰ ὀνόματα ἐπιγράφηται. τοὐναντίον γὰρ δυσχεραίνουσι καὶ μέμφονται παρ´ αὑτοῖς, εἰ καὶ σιωπῶσιν ἄλλως, προσκρούειν οὐ θέλοντες. ἢ νόμισμα μὲν εἴ τῳ χαρίζοισθε κίβδηλον, οὐδεὶς ἂν ἑκὼν λάβοι, μᾶλλον δὲ ὕβριν ἡγοῖτο ἢ δωρεὰν τὸ γιγνόμενον· τιμὴν δὲ κίβδηλον καὶ μηδὲν ἔχουσαν ὑγιὲς νομίζετε δέχεσθαι τοὺς νοῦν ἔχοντας; (31,34) ἀλλ´ ἐὰν μὲν οἰκέτην τις ἀλλότριον ἢ σκεῦος ἀποδῶται ψευσάμενος ὡς ἑαυτοῦ, σφόδρα ἕκαστος ἀγανακτεῖ τῶν ἠπατημένων, καὶ θαυμάζοιμ´ ἄν, εἰ μὴ {θανάτῳ} ἐζημιοῦτε τοῦτον ὑμεῖς· εἰ δ´ ἀλλοτρίαν τις εἰκόνα καὶ μηδὲν αὐτῷ προσήκουσαν ἐξαπατηθεὶς λάβοι παρὰ τῶν μὴ κυρίων· ὃ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλῳ δῷ τις, τούτου κύριος οὐκέτ´ ἐστὶν ἑτέρῳ διδόναι· χάριν αὐτὸν οἴεσθε τοῖς παρακρουσαμένοις ἔχειν; (31,35) δέομαι δέ, ἂν οἱ λόγοι φαίνωνται πικρότεροι, μηθὲν ἐμοὶ δυσχεραίνειν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ὑμᾶς φημι τοῦτο ποιεῖν, τρόπον δέ τινα ἀκούσης τῆς πόλεως αὐτὸ γίγνεσθαι. τὸ δὲ πρᾶγμα εἰ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ὥστε πάναισχρον δοκεῖν ἐξεταζόμενον, τοσούτῳ προθυμότερον ὑμᾶς ἀκούειν δεῖ τοῦ λέγοντος, ὥστε ἀπηλλάχθαι τὸ λοιπὸν τῆς αἰσχύνης. οὐδὲ γὰρ τὰ ἐν τοῖς σώμασι δυσχερῆ χωρὶς ὀδύνης ἔστιν ἰάσασθαι, πολλάκις δὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο σημεῖον ὑπάρχει τοῦ σφόδρα ἐπείγειν τὴν θεραπείαν, τὸ σφόδρα ἀλγεῖν τὸ θεραπευόμενον. (31,36) ὃ τοίνυν ἀρχόμενος εἶπον, οὐδ´ ἂν νῦν ὀκνήσαιμι εἰπεῖν, ὅτι πανταχοῦ μὲν οἰκεῖόν ἐστι φαίνεσθαι τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας ὑγιεῖς καὶ μηδὲν παλίμβολον ἔχοντας μηδὲ δυσχερές, {ἀλλὰ πλεῖστον ἀπάτης καὶ πονηρίας ἀπηλλαγμένους· λέγω δὲ τοὺς ὑμῖν ὁμοίους·} μάλιστα δὲ οἶμαι περὶ τὸ τιμᾶν καὶ τὰς δωρεάς. τὸ γὰρ αἰσχύνην τινὰ προσάπτειν τοῖς καλοῖς καὶ τὸ ἀδίκως ποιεῖν τὸ πάντων δικαιότατον οὐδ´ αἰσθανομένων ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπων τῆς ἑκάστου φύσεως. ὥσπερ οὖν οἱ παρανομοῦντες εἰς τὰ ἱερὰ τῶν εἰς ἄλλ´ ὁτιοῦν ἁμαρτανόντων χείρους εἰσίν, οὕτως οἱ περὶ ταῦτα ἄδικοι καὶ πονηροὶ φαινόμενοι. (31,37) τί γάρ ἐστιν ἱερώτερον τιμῆς ἢ χάριτος; οὐκ ἴστε ὅτι καὶ θεὰς νομίζουσιν οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὰς Χάριτας; ἐὰν οὖν τὰ ἀγάλματα αὐτῶν περικόπτῃ τις ἢ τοὺς βωμοὺς ἀνατρέπῃ, τοῦτον ἡγεῖσθε ἀσεβεῖν· ἐὰν δὲ αὐτὸ λυμήνηται καὶ διαφθείρῃ τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἀφ´ οὗ καὶ τὰς θεὰς ὠνομάσθαι συμβέβηκε, μὴ ὃν δεῖ τρόπον χαριζόμενος, ἀλλ´ ἀγεννῶς καὶ ἀνελευθέρως καὶ μετὰ τέχνης τοῖς εὐεργέταις ἀχαριστῶν, αὐτὸν φρονεῖν φήσομεν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων εἶναι συνετώτερον; ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν καπήλους τοὺς ἐν τοῖς μέτροις κακουργοῦντας, οἷς ὁ βίος ἐστὶν αὐτόθεν ἀπὸ αἰσχροκερδείας, μισεῖτε καὶ κολάζετε, τὴν δὲ πόλιν, εἰ δόξει περὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν πανουργεῖν καὶ τὰς δωρεὰς καπηλεύειν, οὐκ αἰσχύνεσθε, παλίμβολα καὶ παλίμπρατα ποιοῦσαν τὰ σεμνά; (31,38) καὶ οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνο ἐνθυμεῖσθε ὅτι μηδὲ τοῖς καπήλοις μηδεὶς ἔτι ῥᾳδίως πρόσεισι, παρ´ οἷς ἂν πονηρὰ ᾖ τὰ μέτρα. καὶ μὴν ὅτι φύσει τὸ πρᾶγμα τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν, οὐχ ὁ λόγος αὐτὸ ἐξονειδίζει, θεάσασθε οὕτως. εἰ γάρ τις πύθοιτο ὑμῶν πότερα βούλεσθε τοὺς τιμωμένους ὑφ´ ὑμῶν, οἷς οἴεσθε διδόναι τὰς εἰκόνας, ἐπίστασθαι τἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ γιγνόμενον οἷόν ἐστιν ἢ λανθάνειν αὐτούς, οὐκ ἄδηλόν ἐστιν ὃ ἂν εἴποιτε εὖ φρονοῦντες. τί γὰρ ἐκώλυεν εὐθὺς ἐν τῷ ψηφίσματι γράφειν ὥσπερ τἄλλα καὶ τοῦτο, εἶναι δὲ τὴν εἰκόνα αὐτοῖς μίαν τῶν ἀνακειμένων ἢ τὴν τοῦ δεῖνος, εἰ κἀκείνους ἐβούλεσθε γιγνώσκειν; ἀλλ´ οὐδέποτε οἶμαι τοῦτο ἐγγράφετε. (31,39) οὐκοῦν ὅτι μὲν τὰ γιγνόμενα ὀρθῶς καὶ μηθὲν ἔχοντα ἄτοπον οὐδεὶς περιστέλλει δῆλόν ἐστιν. ὅτι δὲ ἥκιστ´ ἄν τις φυλάξαιτο τοὺς εὖ πάσχοντας εἰδέναι τίνα τρόπον τῆς χάριτος τυγχάνουσι καὶ τῶν γιγνομένων περὶ τὴν τιμὴν ὁτιοῦν, εἴ γέ τις ἁπλῶς αὐτὸ πράττοι καὶ δικαίως, ἔτι μοι δοκεῖ τοῦ πρώτου φανερώτερον· ὥστε ἀνάγκη τὸ συμβαῖνον εἶναι πανταχῇ φαῦλον καὶ μηδενὶ μηδὲ ἰδιώτῃ πρέπον. ὁ γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς οἷς τινας εὖ ποιεῖ, παθὼν πρότερος ἢ νὴ Δία κατάρχων καὶ προκαλούμενος εἰς φιλίαν, παρακρουόμενος καὶ φενακίζων, τί ἂν οὗτος ἄλλως ποιήσειεν; ἐπίστασθε τοίνυν ὅτι μηδένα λανθάνει τὸ γιγνόμενον, ἀλλ´ ἔστι διαβόητον καὶ τῶν παρὰ πᾶσι θρυλουμένων, οὐ μόνον ἐπειδὴ λίαν κατακόρως καὶ ἀνέδην αὐτῷ κέχρηνταί τινες, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι παρ´ ὑμῖν πράττεται. [31,30] And yet this argument shows, not only that these men are suffering injustice and outrageous treatment, but also that the argument by which some will perhaps urge that you shall continue your present practice is only an empty subterfuge, or rather, that it argues against the practice. I mean, if they shall say that it is both necessary and expedient to honour men of a later time also, is it not the very reverse of this to insult the men who in the past have received these honours? For what any man of former times would not have chosen to accept if he had known that this was going to happen, is it at all (p35) reasonable to suppose that any man of the present day is glad to accept when he sees what is being done? Consequently, even if not on account of those former benefactors, yet at any rate on account of these whom we are now honouring, it stands to reason that you should guard against the practice. 31 For all men look with suspicion on gifts which are proffered by those who to their knowledge disregard in this manner any person who formerly received public commendation and was regarded as a friend; but those men are especially suspicious who are getting the very honours of which they see that the previous recipients have been deprived. But if your motive should be that they were to receive this honour themselves, or, rather, be thought to have received it, they must at once look upon the action as downright pretence and a mockery. It would be much better to tell those who prefer to have you give yourselves very little concern about those who have previously been honoured, that there is no longer any need for honouring anybody at all, rather than, on the contrary, to bring into disrepute that practice which men say your city has the greatest need of and with respect to a greater number of persons now than ever before. 32 And yet, by Zeus and the gods, even if those who think they are now getting statues were going to feel the warmest gratitude towards you and to praise your democracy to the skies, not even so should this thing have been done. For merely to seek how one can please a person in what one does and how win his good will, and not to consider whether one will be wronging another person whom one should not wrong by so doing, or (p37) will be doing anything at all that one should not — by the gods I declare this befits neither liberal-minded men nor men of decent character. For no one, even the most wicked, chooses any base action which he does not think is to his own advantage at the time, but the essence of wickedness consists in being led by the desire of gain and profit to shrink from no base or unjust action and not to care about the nature of the act, but only whether it is profitable. 33 Therefore, the man who courts the person who is present but slights his former friend, and having forgotten the service this friend has rendered, places highest importance upon the hoped-for benefit from the other — do you not know the term that is applied to him? Is such a man not called a toady everywhere? Is he not considered ignoble, a man not to be trusted? As the case now stands, therefore, the city does not even get the advantage that sundry men are courted by her and so think they are getting a grand thing when their names are put into an inscription. For in fact the opposite is the case: they are annoyed and find fault when by themselves, even if on other occasions they are silent because they do not wish to give offence. Or if you should offer a man a counterfeit coin as a present, there is nobody who would ever willingly take it but would consider the offer an insult rather than a gift, and yet do you imagine that a counterfeit honour, a thing utterly worthless, is ever accepted by persons who have any sense? 34 Yet if any one sells another man's slave, or chattel, falsely claiming that it is his own, the man who is deceived is without exception very indignant, and it would surprise me if you would not even punish the offence with death; but if (p39) a person should be tricked into taking another man's statue to which he has no right from those who have no authority to give it — for what a person gives to another, he no longer has the authority to give to yet another — do you think that he is grateful to those who have duped him? 35 But I ask you, if my words seem rather bitter, not to be at all vexed with me; for I am by no means saying that it is you who do this, but that it happens, in a manner of speaking, against the wish of your city. Still, if the practice is of such a nature that it seems utterly shameful when subjected to examination, the more eagerly ought you to listen to the speaker, so as to be free from the shame of it for the future. For neither can our bodily troubles be healed without pain; and often the very presence of marked pain in the part treated is itself an indication that the treatment is making marked progress. 36 So what I said at the beginning I would not hesitate to say at this point also — that in every situation it is proper that good men should show themselves to be morally sound and to have in their character no equivocal or hateful trait, but, on the contrary, should be utterly free from deceit and baseness — I mean men who are like yourselves — and I think this applies especially to conferring honour and the giving of gifts. For to put any shame upon a noble practice, and to carry out unjustly that which is the most just thing in the world, is the mark of men who have no delicate sense of the nature of each act. Hence just as those who commit sacrilege are worse than those who err in respect to anything else, so too are those who prove unjust and wicked in the matter under discussion. 37 For what is more (p41) sacred than honour or gratitude? Do you not know that the majority of men regard the Graces as indeed goddesses? Therefore, if anyone mutilated their statues or overturns their altars, you hold this man guilty of impiety; but if injury or ruin is done to that very grace (charis) from which these goddesses have derived their name (Charites) by anyone's performing a gracious act in a way that is not right, but in an ignoble, illiberal, and crafty manner showing rank ingratitude to his benefactors, can we say that such a man has sense and is more intelligent than his fellows? Nay, tradesmen who cheat in their measures, men whose livelihood from the very nature of the business depends upon base gain, you hate and punish; but if your city shall gain the reputation of playing the knave in connection with her commendations of good men and of making a traffic of her gifts, will you feel no shame that she makes her sacred awards equivocal and subject to repeated sale? 38 And do you give not even a thought to this truth — that nobody will ever again willingly have dealings with those tradesmen whose measures are dishonest? And besides, that the practice is in essence such as I have shown, and that it is not my speech which casts reproach upon it, I ask you to see from the following consideration: If anyone were to inquire of you whether you prefer, in the case of those who receive honours from you and on whom you think you are bestowing the statues, that they should know (p43) the truth and what sort of transaction it is, or that they should be kept in ignorance, it is perfectly clear what you would say if you are in your right senses. For what was there to prevent your writing explicitly in the decree to begin with, just like its other provisions, this also: that 'their statue shall be one of those already erected' or 'shall be So-and-so's', if you really wanted the recipients also to understand? But you will never put this in your decrees, I warrant! 39 Well, it is perfectly clear that no one tries to disguise things that are done in a straightforward fashion and have nothing irregular about them. And I think it is even more obvious that nobody would be in the least inclined to take precautions to prevent men who are receiving favours at their hands from knowing in just what manner they were getting them and anything whatsoever that was being done in connection with the honour, at least if the action taken were done in a sincere and honourable way. So what is now happening must necessarily be contemptible in every way and ill-befitting for even a man in private station. For the man who, in the very act of doing a kindness to others either because he has previously received a kindness from them, or because he is actually taking the initiative and inviting them to be his friends, then deceives and cheats — what would such a man do in an honest fashion? So, then, you do know that no one is unaware of what is going on, nay, it is notorious and on everybody's tongue, not only now that certain cities have followed this practice to great excess and with utter lack of restraint, but because it is being done even among you.