[31,20] πλὴν ἐκεῖνό γε δῆλόν ἐστιν ὅτι μήτε ὑμεῖς μήτε ἄλλοι τινές, οἳ δοκοῦσιν Ἑλλήνων ἢ βαρβάρων μεγάλοι γενέσθαι, δι´ ἄλλο τι προῆλθον εἰς δόξαν καὶ δύναμιν ἢ τῶν κατὰ μέρος φιλοτίμων τυχόντες καὶ περὶ πλείονος τοῦ ζῆν ἡγουμένων τὴν ὕστερον εὐφημίαν. ἡ γὰρ στήλη καὶ τὸ ἐπίγραμμα καὶ τὸ χαλκοῦν ἑστάναι μέγα δοκεῖ τοῖς γενναίοις ἀνδράσι, καὶ μισθὸς οὗτος ἄξιος τῆς ἀρετῆς τὸ μὴ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ἀνῃρῆσθαι τὸ ὄνομα μηδ´ εἰς ἴσον καταστῆναι τοῖς μὴ γενομένοις, ἀλλὰ ἴχνος τι λιπέσθαι καὶ σημεῖον, ὡς ἂν εἴποι τις, τῆς ἀνδραγαθίας. (31,21) τοὺς ἀγωνιστὰς τούτους ὁρᾶτε ὅσα πάσχουσι γυμναζόμενοι, δαπανῶντες, τὸ τελευταῖον ἀποθνῄσκειν αἱρούμενοι πολλάκις ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἄθλοις. τί οὖν; εἴ τις ἀνέλοι τὸν στέφανον, οὗ χάριν φιλοτιμοῦνται, καὶ τὴν ἐπιγραφὴν τὴν ἐσομένην Ὀλυμπίασιν ἢ Πυθοῖ τῆς νίκης, ἆρ´ οἴεσθε μίαν ἡμέραν αὐτοὺς ἀνέξεσθαι τὸν ἥλιον μόνον, οὐχ ὅπως τἄλλα ὅσα τῷ πράγματι πρόσεστιν ἀηδῆ καὶ χαλεπά; τί δ´; ἐὰν γένηται δῆλον αὐτοῖς ὅτι τὴν εἰκόνα, ἣν ἂν στήσωσιν, ἕτερος αὑτοῦ ποιήσεται, τὸ μὲν τοῦ θέντος ὄνομα ἀνελών, αὑτὸν δὲ ἐπιγράψας, ἔτι θεασόμενον ἡγεῖσθε ἐλθεῖν ἄν τινα ἐκεῖσε, οὐχ ὅπως ἀγωνιούμενον; ὅθεν οἶμαι καὶ βασιλεῖς ἐπιδικάζονται τῆς τοιαύτης μαρτυρίας. (31,22) ἅπασι γάρ ἐστι περὶ πολλοῦ τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς σύμβολα, καὶ οὐδεὶς αἱρεῖται τῶν πολλῶν, ὅ,τι ἂν οἴηται καλὸν {εἶναι, μόνον} αὑτῷ πεπρᾶχθαι, μηδένα δὲ εἰδέναι. πρὸς τοῦ Διός, ἆρα ἀγνοεῖτε τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον οὐκ ἐκείνους μόνον ἀτίμους ποιοῦν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἔρημον τῶν εὐνοησόντων καὶ προθυμησομένων ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς; μηδὲ γὰρ ἐκεῖνο εἰσέλθῃ μηδένα ὑμῶν ὅτι εἴπερ ἄρα μίαν τιμὴν καταλύσετε τὴν τῶν εἰκόνων, αἱ λοιπαὶ δέ εἰσιν ἀναφαίρετοι. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οἱ τὴν μεγίστην ἀναιροῦντες καὶ ἧς μάλιστα ἕκαστος ἐπιθυμεῖ τυγχάνειν ὁμολογοῦσι δήπουθεν ἐκ τοῦ πλείονος μέρους τὴν πόλιν βλάπτειν, εἴ γέ φασι βλαβερὸν εἶναι τὸ πάσας αὐτὰς καταλελύσθαι. (31,23) πρὸς τούτῳ δὲ κἀκεῖνό ἐστιν ὅτι παρ´ οἷς ἂν ἕν τι κινηθῇ, παρ´ ἐκείνοις κεκίνηται πάντα ὁμοίως καὶ τῶν παραπλησίων βέβαιον οὐθέν ἐστιν. οἱ γὰρ τὴν αἰτίαν παραβάντες, καθ´ ἣν οὐκ ἂν ἐδόκει τι συμβῆναι, καὶ ταύτην παρ´ οὐδὲν ἡγησάμενοι, πάντα λελύκασιν ἃ τὴν αὐτὴν εἶχε πρόφασιν τοῦ μένειν βέβαια. οἷον εἴ τις μίαν λύσαι τῶν τιμωριῶν ἡντιναοῦν, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδεμίαν ἰσχυρὰν καταλέλοιπεν. (31,24) εἰ δέ {γέ} τις τὴν μεγίστην ἀνέλοι, φυγὴν ἢ θάνατον, τά γε ἐλάττω τῶν ἐπιτιμίων λοιπὸν ἀνάγκη μηδὲ γεγράφθαι δοκεῖν. ὥσπερ οὖν οἱ παραχαράττοντες τὸ νόμισμα, κἂν μέρος λυμήνωνται, τὸ σύμπαν διεφθαρκέναι δοκοῦσιν ὑπαίτιον ποιήσαντες, ὁμοίως οἱ τῶν τιμῶν τινας ἢ τῶν τιμωριῶν ἀναιροῦντες ὅλον τὸ πρᾶγμα καταλύουσι καὶ τοῦ μηδενὸς ἄξιον δεικνύουσι. (31,25) καὶ μὴν εἴ τίς με ἔροιτο, τὴν μεγίστην ὡς οἷόν τε ἑκατέρων βλάβην φερόντων, τοῦ τε τὰς τιμὰς ἀπίστως ἔχειν καὶ τοῦ τὰς τιμωρίας ἀσθενῶς, εἰ μὴ δυνατὸν ἀμφότερα εὐλαβηθῆναι, πότερον αὐτῶν ἐπιεικέστερον κρίνω καὶ μετριωτέρων ἀνθρώπων, οὐκ ἂν διστάσας τὸ περὶ τὰς τιμωρίας εἴποιμι· εἴ γε τοῦτο μὲν ἔστιν ἀνενεγκεῖν εἰς φιλανθρωπίαν, εἰς ἔλεον, εἰς ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, ἅπερ ἐστὶν οἰκεῖα τοῖς χρηστοῖς· τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀρίστων ἀνδρῶν ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι καὶ τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἆθλα ἀποστερεῖν οὐκ ἔνι τυγχάνειν οὐδεμιᾶς εὐπρεποῦς προφάσεως, ἀλλ´ ἀχαριστίᾳ, φθόνῳ, μικρολογίᾳ, πᾶσι τοῖς αἰσχίστοις ἀνάγκη προσήκειν. ἔτι δὲ οἱ μὲν τοὺς ὄντας πονηροὺς ἧττον κατείργουσι, τὰς κολάσεις ἀνιέντες· οἱ δὲ αὐτοὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἐξαμαρτάνουσι περὶ τοὺς εὐεργέτας. τοσούτῳ δὲ τοῦτο ἐκείνου κάκιον ὅσῳ τὸ αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν τοῦ μὴ σφόδρα κωλύειν ἕτερον. (31,26) οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνο ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ὅτι μὴ τοῦτο ὑπάρχει μέγιστον τῶν δεδομένων τισί· δίχα γὰρ τοῦ πᾶσιν εἶναι φανερὸν ἑαυτοῖς ἐναντία ἐροῦσιν οἱ λέγοντες. φασὶ γὰρ ἀνάγκην εἶναι πολλοὺς ἐν τῷ παρόντι τιμᾶν τῶν ἡγουμένων, οἷς ἅπασιν εἰκόνας εἰ δεήσει κατασκευάζεσθαι, μεγάλην τινὰ ἔσεσθαι τὴν δαπάνην, ὡς τάς γε ἄλλας τιμὰς οὐκ οὔσας κατ´ αὐτοὺς οὐδὲ ἀποδεξομένων αὐτῶν ὡς πολὺ ἐλάττους. (31,27) τὸ μὲν δὴ τῆς δαπάνης οἷόν ἐστιν ὄψεσθε μετὰ μικρόν· τὸ δὲ μεγίστην εἶναι τῶν τιμῶν, ἣν ἀφαιροῦνται τοὺς εἰληφότας πρότερον ἐκ τούτων ὡμολόγηται. καὶ μὴν ἀτόπου γε ὄντος τοῦ τινα παρεῖναι τῶν ἀξίων τιμῆς καὶ μηδεμίαν παρασχεῖν ἀμοιβὴν τῆς εὐεργεσίας, ὡς πάντων μάλιστα ἀνάγκη τούτοις ὁμολογεῖν, οἳ καὶ τὸ μετριώτερον τιμῆσαί τινα τῆς ἀξίας δεινὸν οἴονται, τὸ τιμήσαντας, ἔπειτα δ´ οὐδὲν αἰτιωμένους ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὰ δοθέντα πῶς οὐχ ὑπερβολὴν ἀδικίας ἔχει; τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀχαριστεῖν ἐστι τοῖς εὐεργέταις, τὸ δὲ ὑβρίζειν εἰς αὐτούς, καὶ τὸ μέν ἐστι μὴ τιμᾶν τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας, τὸ δὲ ἀτιμάζειν. (31,28) οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἃ δοκοῦσι τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν ὀφείλειν οὐ παρέχουσιν, οἱ δὲ ἃ σύνηθές ἐστι γίγνεσθαι κατὰ τῶν ἄκρως πονηρῶν, ταῦτα πράττουσι κατ´ αὐτῶν. εἰ γοῦν τις τῶν ποτε νομισθέντων μετρίων αὖθις ἀνήκεστον ἁμάρτοι τι καὶ χαλεπόν, οἷον εἰ προδοσίαν βουλεύσειεν ἢ τυραννίδα, τῶν τοιούτων ἔθος ἐστὶ τὰς τιμὰς ἀναιρεῖσθαι, κἂν ἐπιγραφῆς τινος πρότερον ὦσι τετευχότες. εἶτ´ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν τῶν αὐτῶν ἀξιοῦν ὑμᾶς τοὺς ὁμολογουμένως ἀρίστους, ὧν τοὺς ἀσεβεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἀνοσίους τυγχάνειν οἱ νόμοι κελεύουσιν, οἷς οὐδὲ ταφῆς μέτεστιν; (31,29) ὥστε μοι δοκοῦσιν, ὅσην παρ´ ἑτέροις ἔχουσι τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι πάντες ἐπιθυμίαν, τοσαύτην ἢ καὶ πλείονα ἕξειν παρ´ ὑμῖν, ὅπως μηδέποτε τεύξονται τῶν τοιούτων μηδενός· ὅσῳ τὴν ὕβριν ἕκαστος καὶ τὸ προπηλακισθῆναι μεῖζον ἡγεῖται κακὸν ἢ τὴν τιμὴν ἀγαθὸν νενόμικεν. εἰ γοῦν τινα καλοῖτε εἰς προεδρίαν ἢ πολίτην ἀναγράφοιτε, μέλλοντες ὕστερον ἀναστήσειν ἢ τὴν πολιτείαν ἀφελεῖσθαι, πολλὰ ἂν ἱκετεύσειεν ὑμᾶς ἐᾶν αὑτόν. τοὺς γοῦν τυράννους ἢ τοὺς βασιλέας, ὧν αὖθις οἱ βιαίως ἀρχθέντες καὶ παρανόμως τὰς εἰκόνας ἀνεῖλον καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα ἠφάνισαν, ὅπερ οἶμαι καὶ ἐφ´ ὑμῶν συμβέβηκε, διατεινάμενος εἴποιμ´ ἄν, εἰ προῄδεσαν τοῦτο ἐσόμενον, μήτ´ ἂν εἰκόνας ἑαυτῶν ἐᾶσαί τινα στῆσαι μήτε ὀνόματα ἐγγράψαι.

[31,20] However, this much is clear, that neither you nor any others, whether Greeks or barbarians, who are thought to (p25) have become great, advanced to glory and power for any other reason than because fortune gave to each in succession men who were jealous of honour and regarded their fame in after times as more precious than life. For the pillar, the inscription, and being set up in bronze are regarded as a high honour by noble men, and they deem it a reward worthy of their virtue not to have their name destroyed along with their body and to be brought level with those who have never lived at all, but rather to leave an imprint and a token, so to speak, of their manly prowess. 21 You see what hardships these athletic competitors endure while training, spending money, and finally often even choosing to die in the very midst of the games. Why is it? If we were to abolish the crown for the sake of which they strive, and the inscription which will commemorate their victory at the Olympian or the Pythian games, do you think that they would endure for even one day the heat of the sun, not to mention all the other unpleasant and arduous things which attach to their occupation? Well then, if it becomes clear to them that any statue of them which their countrymen may set up another man is going to appropriate, first removing the name of the victor who dedicated it and then putting his own name there, do you think that anyone will go there any longer even to witness the games, to say nothing of competing? It is for this reason, I think, that kings, too, claim such testimony as this. 22 For all men set great store by the outward tokens of high achievement, and not one man in a thousand is willing to agree that what he regards as a noble deed whole have been done for himself alone and that no other man shall have knowledge of it. (p27) In Heaven's name, do you fail to recognize that this action of yours not only deprives those men of honour, but also leaves the city destitute of men who will be well-disposed and strenuous in her behalf? For let not the thought enter the mind of any of you, that even if you do abolish that one honour, the honour of the grant of a statue, the other honours, nevertheless, cannot be taken away. For, in the first place, those who annul the greatest honour and that which every man is most anxious to gain, admit, I presume, that they are doing injury to the state in the greatest degree, since they concede that it would be injurious that all honours should have been abolished. 23 Moreover, there is this also to be considered — that wherever one part of an institution has been changed, there all parts alike have suffered change and no similar institution is secure. For those who have infringed the principle by observing which it was believed that a certain undesirable thing would not happen, and because they thought the principle was of no importance, have thereby undermined every institution whose stability rested upon the same premises. For instance, if a person should do away with any one whatsoever of the penalties of the law, he has not left any of the others secure either. 24 And if a man were to do away with the greatest of your punishments, banishment or death, it would necessarily be thought in the future that the lesser penalties also were not even on the statute books. Therefore, just as (p29) men who falsely stamp the currency, even if they injure only a part, are regarded as having ruined the whole by making it suspect, in like manner those who annul any of the honours or the punishments are doing away with the whole system and showing that it is worth nothing whatever. 25 Moreover, if anyone were to put this question to me: Admitted that each of the two things causes the greatest possible harm, namely, that there should be no confidence in the honours which a city bestows and that the punishment it inflicts should be ineffectual, if it is not possible to guard against both, which of them I consider more conducive to justice and characteristic of more respectable men, I should unhesitatingly say in reply, "That its punishments should be ineffectual," since this can be credited to humanity, to pity, and to other sentiments of that nature, the very qualities that characterize good men. But to let the memory of the noblest men be forgotten and to deprive them of the rewards of virtue cannot find any plausible excuse, but must be ascribed to ingratitude, envy, meanness and all the basest motives. Again, whereas the former, when they relax their punishments, merely slacken their constraint upon those who are really bad, the latter are themselves committing the greatest sins against their benefactors. This is just as much worse than the other as committing a wrong yourself is worse than failing rigorously to prevent another man from committing a wrong. 26 So, then, it cannot be said, either, that this is not the greatest of the gifts that have been given to any persons, since, apart from the fact that the truth is patent to everyone, those who deny it will be contradicting themselves. For they protest that it is (p31) necessary to honour many of the leading men at the present time, and that if it proves necessary to get statues made for them all, enormous expense will be incurred, since the other honours are not in keeping with their position, and the men themselves would not accept them, as being far too inadequate. 27 As to the matter of expense, you will see in a short time what there is in that plea. But that this is the greatest of your honours which they are taking away from the former recipients, is by this protest conceded. Again, since it is preposterous to pass over any one of those who are worthy of honour and to offer no recompense for his benefaction, as those men above all others must admit who think it a terrible thing even to bestow a lesser honour than a person deserves; is it not an excess of wrong-doing to honour men and then, though having no fault to find with them, to deprive them of what has been given them? The one act, namely, means being ungrateful to your benefactors, but the other means insulting them; the one is a case of not honouring the good men, the other, of dishonouring them. 28 For whereas in the one case you merely fail to grant to men of excellent character what you believe is their due, in the other case you give them the treatment which is customarily accorded to men who are utterly base. If, for instance, any man who formerly was thought respectable should afterwards commit any unpardonable and grievous sin, such as plotting treason or a tyranny, the practice is to revoke this man's honours, even if previously he had received the honour of an inscription. Then is it not a disgrace for you to consider that men who are admittedly the noblest deserve the same treatment as that which the laws command to be (p33) imposed on the impious and unholy, men who have not even a claim to a burial? 29 Consequently, I think that, great as is the desire which all men have to receive honour among other peoples, they will have just as great a desire, or even a greater, that they may never receive any such honour among you; inasmuch as everyone considers the insult and contumely to be a greater evil than he has regarded the honour a good. If, for instance, you were to invite anyone to take a seat of honour or should enroll him as a citizen with the intention of afterwards unseating him or depriving him of his citizenship, he would earnestly implore you to leave him alone. Take tyrants, for instance, or those kings whose statues were destroyed afterwards and whose names were blotted out by those who had been governed with violence and in defiance of law — the very thing, I am inclined to think, that has happened in your time also — I should emphatically say that, if they had foreseen that this was going to take place, they would not have permitted any city either to set up statues of themselves or to inscribe their names upon them.