[3,6] Οὐιεντανοὶ καὶ Φιδηναῖοι μεγάλας καὶ πολυανθρώπους ἔχοντες πόλεις ἐπὶ μὲν τῆς Ῥωμύλου βασιλείας εἰς πόλεμον ὑπὲρ ἀρχῆς καὶ δυναστείας Ῥωμαίοις κατέστησαν, ἐν ᾧ πολλὰς ἀπολέσαντες δυνάμεις ἀμφότεροι καὶ χώρας ἀποδασμῷ ζημιωθέντες ὑπήκοοι τοῖς κεκρατηκόσιν ἠναγκάσθησαν γενέσθαι. περὶ ὧν ἐν τῇ πρὸ ταύτης δεδήλωκα γραφῇ τὸ ἀκριβές· ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς Νόμα Πομπιλίου δυναστείας εἰρήνης ἀπολαύσαντες βεβαίου πολλὴν ἔσχον ἐπίδοσιν εἰς εὐανδρίαν τε καὶ πλοῦτον καὶ τὴν ἄλλην εὐδαιμονίαν. τούτοις δὴ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἐπαρθέντες ἐλευθερίας τε αὖθις ὠρέγοντο καὶ φρόνημα ἐλάμβανον ὑψηλότερον παρασκευάζοντό τε ὡς οὐκέτι Ῥωμαίων ἀκροώμενοι. τέως μὲν οὖν ἄδηλος αὐτῶν ἡ διάνοια τῆς ἀποστάσεως ἦν, ἐν δὲ τῷ πρὸς Ἀλβανοὺς ἐφανερώθη πολέμῳ. ὡς γὰρ ἐπύθοντο πανστρατιᾷ Ῥωμαίους ἐξεληλυθότας ἐπὶ τὸν πρὸς Ἀλβανοὺς ἀγῶνα, κράτιστον ὑπολαβόντες εἰληφέναι καιρὸν ἐπιθέσεως ἀπορρήτους ἐποιήσαντο διὰ τῶν δυνατωτάτων ἀνδρῶν συνωμοσίας ἅπαντας τοὺς ὁπλοφορεῖν δυναμένους εἰς Φιδήνην συνελθεῖν κρύφα καὶ κατ´ ὀλίγους ἰόντας, ὡς ἂν ἥκιστα γένοιντο τοῖς ἐπιβουλευομένοις καταφανεῖς· ἐκεῖ δ´ ὑπομένοντας ἐκδέχεσθαι τὸν καιρόν, ὅτε αἱ Ῥωμαίων τε καὶ Ἀλβανῶν δυνάμεις ἐκλιποῦσαι τοὺς χάρακας ἐπὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα προελεύσονται, (τοῦτον δὲ φανερὸν ποιεῖν αὐτοῖς ἔμελλον διὰ συμβόλων σκοποί τινες ἐν τοῖς ὄρεσι λοχῶντες) ὅταν δὲ ἀρθῇ τὰ σημεῖα λαβόντας τὰ ὅπλα χωρεῖν ἐπ´ αὐτοὺς ἔδει πάντας κατὰ τάχος, (ἦν δὲ οὐ πολλὴ ἡ ἐπὶ τοὺς χάρακας ἀπὸ Φιδήνης φέρουσα ὁδός, ἀλλ´ ὅσον ἢ δυσὶν ὥραις ἢ τρισὶν ἀνυσθῆναι τὸ μακρότατον) ἐπιφανέντας δὲ τῷ ἀγῶνι τέλος ἤδη ἔχοντι ὥσπερ εἰκὸς μηδὲν ἡγεῖσθαι φίλιον, ἀλλ´ ἐάν τε Ἀλβανοὶ νικῶσιν ἐάν τε Ῥωμαῖοι κτείνειν τοὺς κεκρατηκότας αὐτῶν. ταῦτα ἦν ἃ διέγνωστο πράττειν τοῖς προεστηκόσι τῶν πόλεων. εἰ μὲν οὖν θρασύτερον ἐπὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα ὥρμησαν Ἀλβανοὶ Ῥωμαίων καταφρονήσαντες καὶ μιᾷ κρῖναι μάχῃ τὰ ὅλα διέγνωσαν, οὐθὲν ἂν τὸ κωλῦον ἦν τόν τε κατασκευασθέντα δόλον ἐπ´ αὐτοῖς λεληθέναι καὶ διεφθάρθαι τὰ στρατεύματα αὐτῶν ἀμφότερα· νῦν δὲ ἡ διατριβὴ τοῦ πολέμου παράδοξος ἅπασι γενομένη καὶ ὁ χρόνος ἐν ᾧ παρεσκευάζοντο πολὺς ἐφελκυσθεὶς διέχεεν αὐτῶν τὰ βουλεύματα. τῶν γὰρ ἐκ τῆς συνωμοσίας τινές, εἴτε οἰκεῖα κέρδη περιβαλέσθαι ζητοῦντες εἴτε τοῖς κορυφαιοτάτοις τῶν σφετέρων καὶ τὸ ἔργον εἰσηγησαμένοις φθονοῦντες εἴτε μήνυσιν ἑτέρων δεδιότες, ὅ τι πολλοῖς συνέβη παθεῖν ἐν ταῖς πολυανθρώποις καὶ χρονιζομέναις συνωμοσίαις, εἴτε ὑπὸ θείας ἀναγκαζόμενοι γνώμης οὐκ ἀξιούσης ἔργον ἀνόσιον εἰς εὐτυχὲς κατασκῆψαι τέλος μηνυταὶ γίνονται τοῖς πολεμίοις τοῦ δόλου.

[3,6] The Veientes and Fidenates, who inhabited large and populous cities, had in the reign of Romulus engaged in a war with the Romans for command and sovereignty, and after losing many armies in the course of the war and being punished by the loss of part of their territory, they had been forced to become subjects of the conquerors; concerning which I have given a precise account in the preceding Book. But having enjoyed an uninterrupted peace during the reign of Numa Pompilius, they had greatly increased in population, wealth and every other form of prosperity. Elated, therefore, by these advantages, they again aspired to freedom, assumed a bolder spirit and prepared to yield obedience to the Romans no longer. For a time, indeed, their intention of revolting remained undiscovered, but during the Alban war it became manifest. For when they learned that the Romans had marched out with all their forces to engaged the Albans, they thought that they had now got the most favourable opportunity for their attack, and through their most influential men they entered into a secret conspiracy. It was arranged that all who were capable of bearing arms should assemble in Fidenae, (p23) going secretly, a few at a time, so as to escape as far as possible the notice of to against whom the plot was aimed,and should remain there awaiting the moment when the armies of the Romans and Albans should quit their camps and march out to battle, the actual time to be indicated to them by means of signals given by some scouts posted on the mountains; and as soon as the signals were raised they were all to take arms and advance in haste against the combatants (the road leading from Fidenae to the camps was not a long one, but only a march of two or three hours at most), and appearing on the battlefield at the time when presumably the conflict would be over, they were to regard neither side as friends, but whether the Romans or the Albans had won, were to slay the victors. This was the plan of action on which the chiefs of those cities had determined. If, therefore, the Albans, in their contempt for the Romans, had rushed more boldly into an engagement and had resolved to stake everything upon the issue of a single battle, nothing could have hindered the treachery contrived against them from remaining secret and both their armies from being destroyed. But as it was, their delay in beginning war, contrary to all expectations, and the length of time they employed in making their preparations were bringing their foes' plans to nought. For some of the conspirators, either seeking to compass their private advantage or envying their leaders and those who had been the authors of the undertaking or fearing that others might lay information — a thing which has often happened in conspiracies where there are many accomplices (p25) and the execution is long delayed — or being compelled by the will of Heaven, which could not consent that a wicked design should meet with success, informed their enemies of the treachery.