[17,0] ΠΕΡΙ ΠΛΕΟΝΕΞΙΑΣ. (17,1) Οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὑπὲρ τούτων οἴονται λέγειν τῷ φιλοσόφῳ προσήκειν ὑπὲρ ὧν ἕκαστος οὐκ ἔχει τὴν ἀληθῆ δόξαν, ὅπως ἀκούσαντες ὑπὲρ ὧν ἀγνοοῦσι μάθωσι· περὶ δὲ τῶν γνωρίμων καὶ πᾶσιν ὁμοίως φαινομένων περιττὸν εἶναι διδάσκειν. ἐγὼ δὲ εἰ μὲν ἑώρων ἡμᾶς οἷς νομίζομεν ὀρθῶς ἔχειν ἐμμένοντας καὶ μηδὲν ἔξωθεν πράττοντας τῆς ὑπαρχούσης ὑπολήψεως, οὐδ´ ἂν αὐτὸς ᾤμην ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι διατείνασθαι περὶ τῶν προδήλων. (17,2) ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐχὶ τὴν ἄγνοιαν ἡμᾶς τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν κακῶν τοσοῦτον ὁρῶ λυποῦσαν ὅσον τὸ μὴ πείθεσθαι τοῖς ὑπὲρ τούτων διαλογισμοῖς μηδὲ ἀκολουθεῖν αἷς ἔχομεν αὐτοὶ δόξαις, μεγάλην ὠφέλειαν ἡγοῦμαι τὸ συνεχῶς ἀναμιμνήσκειν καὶ διὰ τοῦ λόγου παρακαλεῖν πρὸς τὸ πείθεσθαι καὶ φυλάττειν ἔργῳ τὸ προσῆκον. ὥσπερ γὰρ οἶμαι καὶ τοὺς ἰατροὺς καὶ τοὺς κυβερνήτας ὁρῶμεν πολλάκις τὰ αὐτὰ προστάττοντας, καίτοι τὸ πρῶτον ἀκηκοότων οἷς ἂν κελεύωσιν, {ἀλλ´} ἐπειδὰν ἀμελοῦντας αὐτοὺς καὶ μὴ προσέχοντας βλέπωσιν, οὕτως καὶ κατὰ τὸν βίον χρήσιμόν ἐστι γίγνεσθαι πολλάκις περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τοὺς λόγους, ὅταν εἰδῶσι μὲν οἱ πολλοὶ τὸ δέον, μὴ μέντοι πράττωσιν. (17,3) οὐ γάρ ἐστι τέλος οὔτε τοῖς κάμνουσι τὸ γνῶναι τὸ συμφέρον αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ´ οἶμαι τὸ χρήσασθαι· τοῦτο γὰρ αὐτοῖς παρέξει τὴν ὑγίειαν· οὔτε τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ μαθεῖν γε τὰ ὠφελοῦντα καὶ βλάπτοντα πρὸς τὸν βίον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ διαμαρτάνειν 〈ἐν〉 τῇ τούτων αἱρέσει. καθάπερ γὰρ ἔστιν ἰδεῖν τοὺς ὀφθαλμιῶντας ἐπισταμένους μὲν ὅτι λυπεῖ τὸ προσάγειν τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς τὰς χεῖρας, ὅμως δὲ οὐκ ἐθέλοντας ἀπέχεσθαι, παραπλησίως καὶ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα πράγματα οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ λίαν εἰδότες ὡς οὐ λυσιτελεῖ τι ποιεῖν, οὐδὲν ἧττον ἐμπίπτουσιν εἰς αὐτό. (17,4) τίς γοῦν οὐκ οἶδε τὴν ἀκρασίαν ὡς μέγα ἐστὶ κακὸν τοῖς ἔχουσιν; ἀλλ´ ὅμως μυρίους ἄν τις ἀκρατεῖς εὕροι. καὶ νὴ Δία γε τὴν ἀργίαν ἅπαντες ἴσασιν ὡς οὐ μόνον οὐχ οἵα τε πορίζειν τὰ δέοντα πρὸς τὸ ζῆν, ἀλλ´ ἔτι καὶ τὰ ὄντα ἀπόλλυσι· καίτοι σχεδόν τι πλείους ἔστιν εὑρεῖν τοὺς ἀργοὺς τῶν ἐθελόντων τι πράττειν. (17,5) ὅθεν οἶμαι προσήκει τοὺς ἄμεινον φρονοῦντας ἀεὶ καὶ συνεχῶς ὑπὲρ τούτων λέγειν, ἐάν πως γένηται δυνατὸν ἐπιστρέψαι καὶ βιάσασθαι πρὸς τὸ κρεῖττον. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς μυστηρίοις ὁ ἱεροφάντης οὐχ ἅπαξ προαγορεύει τοῖς μυουμένοις ἕκαστον ὧν χρή, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῶν συμφερόντων λόγους ὥσπερ τινὰ πρόρρησιν ἱερὰν λυσιτελεῖ πολλάκις, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀεὶ λέγεσθαι. (17,6) τὰ γοῦν φλεγμαίνοντα τῶν σωμάτων οὐκ εὐθὺς ἐνέδωκε πρὸς τὴν πρώτην καταιόνησιν, ἄλλ´ ἂν συνεχῶς τοῦτο ποιῇ τις, ἐμαλάχθη καὶ ῥᾷον ἔσχεν· οὐκοῦν ὁμοίως καὶ τὴν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τῶν πολλῶν φλεγμονὴν ἀγαπητὸν εἴ τις δύναιτο πραΰναι διηνεκῶς τῷ λόγῳ χρώμενος. Φημὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ τῆς πλεονεξίας εἰδέναι μὲν ἅπαντας ὡς οὔτε συμφέρον οὔτε καλόν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ τῶν μεγίστων κακῶν αἴτιον, μὴ μέντοι γε ἀπέχεσθαι μηδὲ ἐθέλειν μηδένα ἀνθρώπων ἴσον ἔχειν τῷ πέλας. (17,7) καίτοι τὴν μὲν ἀργίαν καὶ τὴν ἀκρασίαν καὶ καθόλου πάσας ἁπλῶς τὰς ἄλλας κακίας εὕροι τις ἂν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἔχουσι βλαβεράς, καὶ νουθεσίας μὲν οἶμαι καὶ καταγνώσεως τοὺς ἔν τινι τούτων ὑπάρχοντας δικαίως τυγχάνοντας, οὐ μὴν μισουμένους γε οὐδὲ κοινοὺς ἅπασι δοκοῦντας ἐχθρούς. ἡ πλεονεξία δὲ μέγιστον μέν ἐστιν αὐτῷ τινι κακόν· λυπεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς πέλας· καὶ τὸν πλεονέκτην οὐδεὶς ἐλεεῖ δήπουθεν οὐδὲ ἀξιοῖ διδάσκειν, προβάλλονται δὲ ἅπαντες καὶ πολέμιον αὑτῶν νομίζουσιν. (17,8) ἕκαστος οὖν αὐτῶν εἰ βούλεται γνῶναι τὸ μέγεθος τῆς τοιαύτης πονηρίας, ἐννοησάτω πῶς αὐτὸς ἔχει πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιχειροῦντας πλεονεκτεῖν· οὕτως γὰρ ἂν συμβάλοι πῶς καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς ἀνάγκη πρὸς ἐκεῖνον ἔχειν, ἐὰν ᾖ τοιοῦτος. καὶ μὴν ὅ γε Εὐριπίδης, οὐδενὸς ἧττον ἔνδοξος ὢν τῶν ποιητῶν, τὴν Ἰοκάστην εἰσάγει λέγουσαν πρὸς τὸν Ἐτεοκλέα, παρακαλοῦσαν αὐτὸν ἀποστῆναι τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν τὸν ἀδελφόν, οὕτω πως· (17,9) τί τῆς κακίστης δαιμόνων ἐφίεσαι πλεονεξίας, παῖ; μὴ σύ γ´. ἄδικος ἡ θεός. πολλοὺς δ´ ἐς οἴκους καὶ πόλεις εὐδαίμονας εἰσῆλθε κἀξῆλθ ἐπ´ ὀλέθρῳ τῶν χρωμένων· ἐφ´ ᾗ σὺ μαίνει. τοῦτο κάλλιστον βροτοῖς, ἰσότητα τιμᾶν καὶ φίλους εἶναι φίλοις πόλεις τε πόλεσι συμμάχους τε συμμάχοις συνδεῖν· τὸ γὰρ ἴσον νόμιμον ἀνθρώποις ἔφυ, τῷ πλέονι δ´ ἀεὶ πολέμιον καθίσταται τοὔλασσον, ἐχθρᾶς θ´ ἡμέρας κατάρχεται.

[17,0] The Seventeenth Discourse: On Covetousness. 1 The majority of men think that they should speak only on those subjects concerning which the common man has not the true opinion, in order that they may hear and get guidance on the matters whereof they are ignorant; but regarding what is well known and patent to all alike they think it superfluous to instruct. Yet for my own part, if I saw that we were holding to what we believe to be right and were doing nothing out of harmony with the view we already have, I should not myself hold it necessary to insist on matters that are perfectly clear. 2 However, since I observe that it is not our ignorance of the difference between good and evil that hurts us, so much as it is our failure to heed the dictates of reason on these matters and to be true to our personal opinions, I consider it most salutary to remind men of this without ceasing, and to appeal to their reason to give heed and in their acts to observe what is right and proper. For instance, just as we see physicians and pilots repeating their orders time and again to those under their command, although they were heard the first time — but still they do so when they see them neglectful and unattentive — so too in life it is (p191) useful to speak about the same things repeatedly, when the majority know what is their duty, but nevertheless fail to do it. 3 For it is not the main thing that the sick should know what is beneficial to them, but, I suppose, that they should use the treatment; since it is this that will bring them health; nor that men in general should learn what things are helpful and what are injurious to their lives, but that they would make no mistake by their choice between these. For just as one may see persons who are suffering from ophthalmia and know that it hurts to put their hands to their eyes, but still are unwilling to refrain from so doing, so likewise in regard to matters in general, the majority, even though they know perfectly well that it is not advantageous to do a certain thing, none the less fall to doing it. 4 Who, for instance, does not know that intemperance is a great evil to its victims? But for all that you can find thousands that are intemperate. Yes, and idleness everybody must certainly know is not only unable to provide the necessaries of life, but, in addition, is destructive to what one already has; and yet in very truth you can find more idlers than men willing to work. 5 Consequently, in my opinion it devolves upon the more thoughtful on all occasions and continually to speak of these matters, in the hope that it may prove possible to make men change their ways and to force them to the better course. For just as in the Mysteries the initiating priest more than once explains beforehand to those who are being initiated each single thing that they must do, in like manner it is profitable that the words concerning things beneficial be repeated often, or (p193) rather, all the time, just like some sacred admonition. 6 We know, for instance, that inflamed parts of the body do not yield at once to the first fomentation, but that if the treatment is continued, the swelling is softened and relief is given. So in a like manner we must be well content if we are able to assuage the inflammation in the souls of the many by the unceasing use of the word of reason. So I maintain in regard to covetousness too, that all men do know it is neither expedient nor honourable, but the cause of the greatest evils; and that in spite of all this, not one man refrains from it or is willing to have equality of possessions with his neighbour. 7 And yet you will find that, although idleness, intemperance and, to express it in general terms, all the other vices without exception are injurious to the very men who practice them; and although those who are addicted to any of them do deservedly, in my opinion, meet with admonishment and condemnation, still you certainly will find that they are not hated or regarded as the common enemies of all mankind. But greed is not only the greatest evil to a man himself, but it injures his neighbours as well. And so no one pities, forsooth, the covetous man or cares to instruct him, but all shun him and regard him as their enemy. 8 If, then, each of those here present wishes to know the enormity of this wickedness, let him consider how he himself feels toward (p195) those who attempt to overreach him; for in this way he can get an idea as to how other men must feel toward him if he is that sort of man. And further too, Euripides too, a poet second to none other in reputation, brings Iocasta on the stage addressing Eteocles and urging him to refrain from trying to overreach his brother, in some such words as these: 9 At greed, the worst of deities, my son, Why graspest thou? Do not; she is Queen of wrong. Houses many and happy cities enters she, Nor leaves till ruined are her votaries. Thou art mad for her! — 'tis best to venerate Equality, which knitteth friends to friends, Cities to cities, allies to allies. Nature gave men the law of equal rights, And the less, ever marshalled against The greater, ushers in the dawn of hate.