Texte grec : 
  
 
  
   | [55,10] (Dion) Εἴπερ γε, ὦ μακάριε, καὶ τὴν Ἀρχιλόχου ἀλώπεκα τοῖς λέουσι καὶ
  ταῖς παρδάλεσι παραβάλλομεν καὶ οὐδὲν ἢ μὴ πολὺ ἀποδεῖν φαμεν.
  ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἴσως καὶ τῶν Ὁμήρου τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀποδοκιμάζεις, ὅπου
  μέμνηται ψαρῶν ἢ κολοιῶν ἢ ἀκρίδων ἢ δαλοῦ ἢ τέφρας ἢ κυάμων
  τε καὶ ἐρεβίνθων ἢ λικμῶντας ἀνθρώπους πεποίηκεν, ἀλλὰ ταῦτά
 (11) σοι δοκεῖ τὰ φαυλότατα εἶναι τῶν Ὁμήρου· μόνους δὲ θαυμάζεις
  τοὺς λέοντας καὶ τοὺς ἀετοὺς καὶ τὰς Σκύλλας καὶ τοὺς Κύκλωπας,
  οἷς ἐκεῖνος ἐκήλει τοὺς ἀναισθήτους, ὥσπερ αἱ τίτθαι τὰ παιδία
  διηγούμεναι τὴν Λάμιαν. καὶ μὴν ὥσπερ Ὅμηρος διά τε μύθων 
  καὶ ἱστορίας ἐπεχείρησε τοὺς ἀνθρώπους παιδεύειν, σφόδρα
  ἐργώδεις ὄντας παιδευθῆναι, καὶ Σωκράτης πολλάκις ἐχρῆτο τῷ
  τοιούτῳ, ποτὲ μὲν σπουδάζειν ὁμολογῶν, ποτὲ δὲ παίζειν προσποιούμενος,
   τούτου ἕνεκεν ἀνθρώπους ὠφέλει· ἴσως δὲ προσέκρουσε
 (12) τοῖς μυθολόγοις καὶ τοῖς συγγραφεῦσιν. οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ τοὺς
  περὶ Γοργίαν ἢ Πῶλον ἢ Θρασύμαχον ἢ Πρόδικον ἢ Μένωνα ἢ
  Εὐθύφρονα ἢ Ἄνυτον ἢ Ἀλκιβιάδην ἢ Λάχητα μάτην ἐποίει λέγοντας, 
  ἐξὸν ἀφελεῖν τὰ ὀνόματα· ἀλλὰ ᾔδει τούτῳ καὶ μάλιστα
  ὀνήσων τοὺς ἀκούοντας, εἴ πως ξυνεῖεν· ἀπὸ γὰρ τῶν λόγων τοὺς
  ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοὺς λόγους ξυνορᾶν οὐ ῥᾴδιον 
  ἄλλοις ἢ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις καὶ τοῖς πεπαιδευμένοις. οἱ δὲ
  πολλοὶ μάτην οἴονται τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεσθαι καὶ ὄχλον ἄλλως καὶ
 (13) φλυαρίαν ἡγοῦνται. Σωκράτης δὲ ἐνόμιζεν, ὁσάκις μὲν ἀλαζόνα
  ἄνθρωπον εἰσάγει, περὶ ἀλαζονείας λέγειν· ὁπότε δὲ ἀναίσχυντον
  καὶ βδελυρόν, περὶ ἀναιδείας καὶ βδελυρίας· ὁπότε δὲ ἀγνώμονα 
  καὶ ὀργίλον, ἀγνωμοσύνης καὶ ὀργῆς ἀποτρέπειν. καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
  ἄλλων ὁμοίως τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰ νοσήματα ἐπ´ αὐτῶν τῶν ἀνθρώπων 
  τῶν ἐχομένων τοῖς πάθεσιν ἢ τοῖς νοσήμασι σαφέστερον ἐδείκνυεν
 (14)  ὁποῖά ἐστιν ἢ εἰ τοὺς λόγους ψιλοὺς ἔλεγε. δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ
  τοῦτο παρ´ Ὁμήρου λαβεῖν. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος, ὅταν μὲν διηγῆται περὶ
  Δόλωνος, ὅπως μὲν ἐπεθύμησε τῶν ἵππων τῶν Ἀχιλλέως, ὅπως
  δὲ τοὺς πολεμίους ἀποφεύγειν δυνάμενος ἔστη τοῦ δόρατος ἐγγὺς
  παγέντος καὶ οὐδὲν αὐτὸν ὤνησε τὸ τάχος, ὅπως δὲ ἐβάμβαινεν
  ὑπὸ τοῦ δέους καὶ συνεκρότει τοὺς ὀδόντας, ὅπως δὲ ἔλεγε τοῖς πολεμίοις, 
  οὐ μόνον εἴ τι ἐρωτῷεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὲρ ὧν μηδεὶς ἐπυνθάνετο 
  (καὶ γὰρ τοὺς ἵππους ἐμήνυσε τοὺς Θρᾳκικοὺς καὶ τὸν
  Ῥῆσον, ὃν οὐδεὶς ᾔδει ἀφιγμένον)· ταῦτα δὲ λέγων οὕτω σφόδρα
  ἐναργῶς οὐ περὶ δειλίας ὑμῖν καὶ φιλοδοξίας δοκεῖ διαλέγεσθαι;
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      Traduction française : 
  
  
  
       
  | [55,10] (Dion) I shall, my dear fellow, since indeed we compare 
the fox of Archilochus with the lions and 
leopards of Homer and declare it to be not at all, 
or not much, inferior. However, perhaps you disapprove 
also of such Homeric similes as those in which 
he refers to starlings or daws or locusts or a firebrand 
or ashes or beans and chickpeas, or the one in which 
he has depicted men winnowing —perhaps these 
seem to you to be the most inferior portions of 
Homer's work, while you admire only his lions and 
eagles and Scyllas and Cyclopes, with which he was 
wont to beguile stupid people, just as nurses beguile 
children with tales of the Lamia. Indeed, just as 
Homer through myths and history undertook to instruct 
human beings, who are very troublesome to 
instruct, so also Socrates often used this sort of device, 
sometimes admitting that he was in earnest and 
sometimes pretending to be joking, with the aim of 
benefiting mankind though in so doing he perhaps 
came into conflict with mvthologists and historians.
(12) Again, it was not without conscious purpose that 
he represented Gorgias or Polus or Thrasymachus 
or Prodicus or Meno or Euthyphro or Anytus or 
Alcibiades or Laches as speaking, when he might 
have omitted their names ; on the contrary, he
knew that by this device most of all he would benefit 
his hearers, if perchance they grasped the point ; for 
to comprehend hurnan beings from their words, or 
their words from human beings, is not an easy task 
for any but philosophers and educated persons. On 
the other hand, most men suppose that such items 
are purposeless, and they regard them as mere vexation 
and nonsense. But Socrates held that, every 
time he introduces a boastful man, he is speaking of 
boastfulness ; every time he introduces a shameless, 
loathsome man, he is speaking of shamelessness and 
loathsomeness ; every time he introduces an unreasonable, 
irascible man, he is turning his hearers 
against unreason and anger. Moreover, in all other 
cases similarly he revealed the truc nature of the 
passions and maladies of men in the persons of the 
very ones who were afflicted by the passions or 
the maladies more distinctly than if he were using 
the words by themselves.
(14) But it appears to me that he took this too from 
Homer. For example, when Homer tells about 
Dolon, how he conceived a longing for the horses of 
Achilles, and how, when he might have fled from the 
enemy, he halted with his lance planted close beside 
him and obtained no benefit from his fleetness, and 
how his teeth chattered and struck together from 
terror, and how he talked to the enemy, not only 
when they asked him a question, but even on topics 
about which no one was inquiring — for instance, he 
gave information about the Thracian horses and 
about Rhesus, of whose arrivai no one knew —by 
telling all this so very plainly does Homer not seem 
to you to be discoursing on cowardice and love of 
notoriety ?
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