[3,55] Τῷ δ´ ἑξῆς ἔτει παραλαβὼν τὴν δύναμιν ἐπὶ Σαβίνους ἦγεν ἐκ πολλοῦ τὴν προαίρεσιν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν παρασκευὴν τὴν ἐφ´ ἑαυτοὺς προεγνωκότας. οὐχ ὑπομείναντες δὲ εἰς τὴν ἑαυτῶν χώραν παρεῖναι τὸν πόλεμον, ἀλλ´ ἀντιπαρασκευασάμενοι δύναμιν ἱκανὴν ἐχώρουν ὁμόσε. γενομένης δὲ αὐτοῖς μάχης περὶ τὰ μεθόρια τῆς χώρας ἄχρι νυκτὸς ἐνίκων μὲν οὐδέτεροι, πάνυ δ´ ἰσχυρῶς ἐπόνησαν ἀμφότεροι. ταῖς γοῦν ἑξῆς ἡμέραις οὔτε ὁ τῶν Σαβίνων ἡγεμὼν προῆγεν ἐκ τοῦ χάρακος τὰς δυνάμεις οὔτε ὁ τῶν Ῥωμαίων βασιλεύς, ἀλλ´ ἀναστρατοπεδεύσαντες ἀμφότεροι καὶ τῆς ἀλλήλων γῆς οὐδὲν κακώσαντες ἀπῄεσαν ἐπ´ οἴκου. γνώμη δ´ ἀμφοτέρων ἦν ὁμοία μείζονα δύναμιν ἑτέραν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀλλήλων χώραν ἐξάγειν ἔαρος ἀρχομένου. ἐπεὶ δὲ πάντα παρεσκεύαστο αὐτοῖς, πρότεροι μὲν ἐξῆλθον οἱ Σαβῖνοι Τυρρηνῶν ἔχοντες {δύναμιν} ἱκανὴν {πρὸς} συμμαχίαν καὶ καταστρατοπεδεύονται Φιδήνης πλησίον περὶ τὰς συμβολὰς τοῦ τε Ἀνίητος καὶ τοῦ Τεβέριος ποταμοῦ διττοὺς βαλόμενοι τοὺς χάρακας ἐναντίους τε καὶ συνεχεῖς ἀλλήλοις, μέσον ἔχοντες τὸ κοινὸν ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τῶν ποταμῶν ῥεῖθρον, ἐφ´ οὗ κατεσκεύαστο γέφυρα ξυλόφρακτος σκάφαις ἀνεχομένη καὶ σχεδίαις ἡ ποιοῦσα ταχείας τὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀφίξεις καὶ τὸν χάρακα ἕνα. πυθόμενος δὲ τὴν εἰσβολὴν αὐτῶν ὁ Ταρκύνιος ἐξῆγε καὶ αὐτὸς τὸ Ῥωμαίων στράτευμα καθιδρύεταί τε μικρὸν ἀνωτέρω τῆς ἐκείνων στρατοπεδείας παρὰ τὸν Ἀνίητα ποταμὸν ἐπὶ λόφου τινὸς καρτεροῦ. ἁπάσῃ δὲ προθυμίᾳ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ὡρμημένων ἀμφοτέρων οὐδεὶς ἀγὼν ἐκ παρατάξεως οὔτε μείζων οὔτ´ ἐλάσσων αὐτοῖς συνέστη. ἔφθασε γὰρ ὁ Ταρκύνιος ἀγχινοίᾳ στρατηγικῇ πάντα συντρίψας τὰ τῶν Σαβίνων πράγματα καὶ τὰς παρεμβολὰς αὐτῶν ἀμφοτέρας ἀράμενος. τὸ δὲ στρατήγημα τοῦ ἀνδρὸς τοιόνδε ἦν·

[3,55] The following year he led his army against the Sabines, who had long since been aware of his purpose and preparations against them. They were unwilling, however, to let the war to be brought into their own country, but having got ready an adequate force in their turn, they were advancing to meet him. And upon the confines of their territory they engaged in a battle which lasted till night, neither army being victorious, but both suffering very severely. At all events, during the following days neither the Sabine general nor the Roman king led his forces out of their entrenchments, but both broke camp and returned home without doing any injury to the other's territory. The intention of both was the same, namely, to lead out a new and (p209) larger force against the other's country at the beginning of spring. After they had made all their preparations, the Sabines first took the field, strengthened with a sufficient body of Tyrrhenian auxiliaries, and encamped near Fidenae, at the confluence of the Anio and the Tiber rivers. They pitched two camps opposite and adjoining each other, the united stream of both rivers running between them, over which was built a wooden bridge resting on boats and rafts, thus affording quick communication between them and making them one camp. Tarquinius, being informed of their irruption, marched out in his turn with the Roman army and pitched his camp a little above theirs, near the river Anio, upon a strongly situated hill. But though both armies had all the zeal imaginable for the war, no pitched battle, either great or small, occurred between them; for Tarquinius by a timely stratagem ruined all the plans of the Sabines and gained possession of both their camps. His stratagem was this: