[34,40] ἐκεῖνο μέντοι καθόλου λέγω, τὴν τοιαύτην ἀνάτασιν
μηδαμῶς συμφέρειν, καθ´ ἣν οὐδὲν ποιῆσαι διεγνωκότες
εἰς ὑποψίαν ἔρχεσθε τοῖς ἡγεμόσιν· ἀλλ´ ὃν μὲν ἂν κρίνητε
ἐξαιρήσεσθαι καὶ δοκῇ τοιαῦτα ἀδικεῖν, ὥστε παραπέμψαι μὴ συμφέρειν,
τοῦτον ὡς ἐξελέγξοντες παρασκευάζεσθε, καὶ τὴν γνώμην
εὐθὺς ἔχετε ὡς πρὸς ἐχθρὸν καὶ ἐπιβουλεύοντα ὑμῖν. περὶ οὗ δ´
ἂν ἄλλως προνοῆτε * μηδὲν ἢ μὴ μεγάλα ἁμαρτάνειν ἢ δι´ ἣν
δήποτε αἰτίαν μὴ νομίζητε ἐπιτήδειον εἶναι, τοῦτον μηδὲ ἐρεθίζετε
(41) μηδὲ εἰς ὀργὴν κατὰ τῆς πόλεως ἄγετε· ὥσπερ οἶμαι τὰ βάρη
ταῦτ´, ἂν μὲν σφόδρα πιέζῃ καὶ ἀνέχεσθαι μὴ δυνώμεθα, ζητοῦμεν
ὡς τάχιστα ἀπορρῖψαι, μετρίως δὲ ἐνοχλούμενοι καὶ ὁρῶντες ἀνάγκην
οὖσαν φέρειν ἢ τοῦτο ἢ μεῖζον ἕτερον, σκοποῦμεν ὡς κουφότατα
ἐπέσται. ταῦτά ἐστι σωφρονούσης πόλεως. οὕτως καὶ ἀγαπήσουσιν
ὑμᾶς οἱ πλείους καὶ φοβήσεταί τις ἀδικεῖν, καὶ οὐ μὴ
πλῆθος ἄδικον μηδὲ ἀλόγιστον ὄχλον ὑμᾶς νομίσωσιν, ὁρμῇ τινι
(42) καὶ φορᾷ χρώμενον. τουτὶ μὲν γάρ, ὃ ποιεῖ νῦν ὁ πρύτανις, {καὶ}
παντελῶς ἀνόητον ἦν ἄν, εἰ καὶ διεγνώκειτε κατηγορεῖν· μηδέπω μέντοι
καιρὸς ᾖ φανερῶς οὕτως διαφέρεσθαι καὶ προλέγειν. ἀλλ´
ἐπειδή τις τῶν ὑμετέρων πολιτῶν ἐν καιροῖς ἀναγκαίοις τῇ πόλει
παρέσχεν αὑτὸν καὶ λαμπρὸς ἔδοξε δυοῖν ἡγεμόνων κατηγορήσας
ἐφεξῆς, οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζουσι τοιούτου τινὸς ἔργου δεῖν αὐτοῖς.
τοῦτο δὲ ὅμοιόν ἐστιν, ὥσπερ εἴ τις ἰατρὸν ἰδὼν εἴς τι τῶν ὠφελίμων
φαρμάκων ἐκ μέρους τι μιγνύντα καὶ θανάσιμον, μηδὲν ἄλλο
εἰδώς, μήτε ὅπως συνετέθη μήτε ὁπόσον δεῖ λαβεῖν, μιμεῖσθαι
βούλοιτο. τὸ μὲν οὖν αὐτοσχεδιάζειν τὰ μέγιστα καὶ προεστάναι
πόλεως ἡγεῖσθαι παντὸς εἶναι τοῦ ἐλπίσαντος οὐ πολὺ τῶν
τοιούτων ἀφέστηκεν.
(43) ἐγὼ δ´ ὑπὲρ τῶν πρὸς τοὺς Μαλλώτας καὶ τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις
εἰπὼν ἔτι παύσομαι. καὶ γὰρ ἱκανῶς ἀνέχεσθαι δοκεῖτέ μοι. πρὸς
μὲν οὖν τούτους, λέγω δὲ Μαλλώτας, εἴ τι πεποιήκασιν ἀγνωμόνως,
ὥσπερ πεποιήκασι, τὴν ὀργὴν καταβαλόντες καὶ τὴν τιμωρίαν, ἣν
ἐνομίζετε ὀφείλεσθαι ὑμῖν, αὐτοῖς χαρισάμενοι, περὶ τοῦ πράγματος
διακρίθητε {καὶ τὸ περὶ τῆς χώρας}, τὸ φέρειν τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ
μὴ φιλονικεῖν, τοῦθ´, ὥσπερ ἐστίν, ἡγησάμενοι μέγα καὶ τῷ
παντὶ κρειττόνων ἀνδρῶν, ἄλλως τε πρὸς τοσούτῳ καταδεεστέρους—
(44) οὐ γάρ ἐστι κίνδυνος μὴ Μαλλωτῶν ἐσομένων ἀσθενέστεροι δόξετε
—μηδὲ τοὺς παροξυνοῦντας ὑμᾶς, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα μὲν αὐτοὶ δικασταὶ
γενόμενοι καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἐπιμελῶς ἐξετάσαντες ἄνευ πάσης ἀπεχθείας
καὶ τῆς πρὸς αὑτοὺς χάριτος καταθέσθαι, μὴ μόνον ἀποστάντες
τῆς ἔριδος καὶ τοῦ ζητεῖν ἐξ ἅπαντος πλέον ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ
συγχωροῦντές τε καὶ παριέντες αὐτοῖς ὅ, τι ἂν ᾖ μέτριον. ὥσπερ
γὰρ καὶ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν ἐπαινεῖτε τοὺς εὐγνώμονας καὶ βλαβῆναί
{τινας} μᾶλλον αἱρουμένους ἢ διαφέρεσθαι πρός τινας, οὕτω καὶ
κοινῇ συμβαίνει τὰς τοιαύτας πόλεις εὐδοκιμεῖν.
| [34,40] This, however, I declare as a general principle :
that so uncompromising a policy on your part is in
no way beneficial, a policy which, although you
have no intention to proceed to active measures,
nevertheless makes you incur the distrust of your
superior officers ; but on the contrary, when you
decide that you are going to remove some one, and
it is thought that he is guilty of such misdeeds that
it is not expedient to ignore them, make yourselves
ready to convict him and immediately behave
toward him as toward a personal enemy, and one who
is plotting against you. But regarding a man concerning
whom you foresee a different outcome, if
you believe him to be guilty of no misdeeds—or
none of any importance—or if for whatever reason
you do not believe him to deserve such treatment, do
not irritate him or move him to anger against the
city. In very much the same way, I fancy, if those
burdens that we bear are very oppressive and we
cannot endure them, we seek to cast them off as
speedily as possible, whereas if we are only moderately
inconvenienced by them and see that we must carry
either the load we have or another that is greater,
we consider how they may rest upon our shoulders
as lightly as possible.
That is the policy of a prudent state. Under such a
policy not only will most people be fond of you, but
a man will fear to do you wrong, and men in general
will not think you to be a wicked populace or an
unreasoning mob, a mob that acts on a kind of
impulse and in headlong fashion. For this thing
that your president is now doing would truly be
altogether foolish, even if you were of a mind to bring
accusations—though perhaps it may not yet be the
proper moment to quarrel so openly and to make
pronouncements ; but remember that as soon as
one of your fellow-citizens has in a moment of urgent
need placed himself at the disposal of the state and
gained a brilliant reputation by accusing two officials
in quick succession, the masses think that they too
must try some such exploit. But that is very
much as if a man, on seeing a physician mix with
some beneficent drug a small portion also of one that
is deadly, and without any further knowledge as
to how the medicine was compounded or how much
to take, should wish to follow his example. Yet
surely the belief that impromptu action in matters
of highest moment and political leadership are within
the competence of any one who has aspired to undertake
it is not far removed from such behaviour.
(43) However, when I have made a few more remarks
regarding your dealings with the people of Mallus
and with the other cities, I shall cease ; for you
seem to me to have displayed sufficient patience.
Weil then, with reference to the first—I mean the
people of Mallus—if they have behaved at all senselessly,
as indeed they have, lay aside your anger,
graciously forgive them the revenge that you thought
to be your due, and come to terms regarding
your boundary dispute, believing that to endure such
treatment and not to court a quarrel is, as in fact it
is, a great achievement and one befitting men who are
altogether superior, especially in relation to men so
vastly inferior. For there is no danger that you will
be thought weaker than any men of Mallus that the
future may produce. And do not listen to those who
try to stir you up, but, if at all possible, act as your
own judges, and, examining the matter with care,
apart from all malice or partiality for your own
interests, make a settlement of the trouble ; do not
merely refrain from strife and from seeking to gain
the advantage by any and every means, but concede
and yield to them anything within reason. For just
as you have words of praise for those in private life
who are reasonable and prefer occasionally to submit
to wrong rather than to quarrel with people, so also
in public relations we find that cities of that sort
are in good repute.
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