Texte grec :
| [3,85] ὥστε ὁ φιλόπονος καὶ ἐγκρατὴς οὐ μόνον βασιλεύειν
ἱκανώτερός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἥδιον βιοτεύει πολὺ τῶν ἐναντίων.
{ἐγρηγόρσεως δὲ καὶ ὕπνου τοῖς μὲν στρατιώταις ἐξ ἴσου μέτεστι,
τῶν μὲν φυλαττόντων ἐν μέρει, τῶν δὲ ἀναπαυομένων· ὁ δὲ στρατηγὸς
ἀγρυπνότερός ἐστι τῶν ἀεὶ φυλαττόντων.}
{ καὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἀφεκτέον καὶ γαστρὶ καὶ ὕπνῳ καὶ ἀφροδισίοις ἐλάχιστα
προσεκτέον, {ἢ τῷ φιλουμένῳ μὲν ὑπὸ πάντων, μηδένα δὲ ἔχοντι ἐπιβουλεύοντα.}
(86) φιλίαν γε μὴν ἁπάντων νενόμικε τῶν αὑτοῦ κτημάτων κάλλιστον καὶ
ἱερώτατον. οὐ γὰρ οὕτως αἰσχρὸν εἶναι {τὸ βασιλεύειν} οὐδὲ ἐπικίνδυνον
χρημάτων ἀπορεῖν ὡς φίλων, οὐδ´ ἂν
οὕτως τῇ χορηγίᾳ καὶ τοῖς στρατοπέδοις καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ δυνάμει διαφυλάττειν
(87) τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὡς τῇ πίστει τῶν φίλων. μόνος μὲν
γὰρ οὐδεὶς πρὸς οὐδὲν οὐδὲ τῶν ἰδίων ἱκανός ἐστι· τοῖς δὲ βασιλεῦσιν ὅσῳ πλείω
τε καὶ μείζω πράττειν ἀνάγκη, πλειόνων δεῖ καὶ
τῶν συνεργούντων καὶ μετ´ εὐνοίας πλείονος. ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὰ
μέγιστα καὶ σπουδαιότατα τῶν πραγμάτων ἢ πιστεύειν ἑτέροις ἢ προΐεσθαι.
(88) καὶ τοίνυν τοῖς μὲν ἰδιώταις οἱ νόμοι παρέχουσι τὸ
μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι ῥᾳδίως ὑπὸ τούτων οἷς ἂν συμβάλωσιν ἢ χρήματα
πιστεύσαντες ἢ οἶκον ἐπιτρέψαντες ἢ ἔργου τινὸς κοινωνήσαντες,
ζημιοῦντες τὸν ἀδικοῦντα· τοῖς δὲ βασιλεῦσι τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι
πιστεύσαντας οὐκ ἔστι παρὰ τῶν νόμων ζητεῖν, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τῆς εὐνοίας.
(89) καὶ γὰρ ἰσχυροτάτους μὲν εἰκὸς ἁπάντων εἶναι τοὺς ἐγγὺς
τῶν βασιλέων καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν συνδιοικοῦντας. ἀπὸ δὲ τούτων οὐκ
ἔστιν ἄλλη φυλακὴ πλὴν τὸ ἀγαπᾶσθαι· καὶ τοῖς μὲν τυχοῦσιν οὐκ
ἀσφαλὲς εἰκῇ μεταδιδόναι δυνάμεως, ὅσῳ δ´ ἄν τις τοὺς φίλους
ἰσχυροτέρους ποιῇ, τοσούτῳ ἰσχυρότερος αὐτὸς γίγνεται.
|
|
Traduction française :
| [3,85] Consequently,
he who loves to toil and exercices self-control is not
only better qualified to be king but is able to live a
much more pleasant life th an those in the opposite case.
(86) Friendship, moreover, the good king holds to be the
fairest and most sacred of his possessions, believing
that the lack of means is not so shameful or perilous
for a king as the lack of friends, and that he maintains
his happy state, not so much by means of
revenues and armies and his other sources of strength,
as by the loyalty of his friends. For no one, of and
by himself, is sufficient for a single one of even his
own needs ; and the more and greater the responsibilities
of a king are, the greater is the number of
co-workers that he needs, and the greater the loyalty
required of them, since he is forced to entrust his
greatest and most important interests to others or
else to abandon them. Furthermore, the law protects
the private individual from being easily wronged by
men with whom he enters into business relations,
either by entrusting them with money, or by making
them agents of an estate, or by entering into partnership
with them in some enterprise ; and it does so
by punishing the offender. A king, however, cannot
look to the law for protection against betrayal
of a trust, but must depend upon loyalty. Naturally,
those who stand near the king and help him rule
the country are the strongest, and from them he
has no other protection than their love. Consequently,
it is not a safe policy for him to share his
power carelessly with the first men he meets ; but
the stronger he makes his friends, the stronger he
becomes himself.
|
|
