[31,130] τὸ μὲν οὖν ψευδῆ τὴν πόλιν δεικνύναι καὶ περὶ τὰς δωρεὰς ἄπιστον καὶ τὸ τοὺς εὐεργέτας ἀδικεῖν, ἀφαιρουμένην αὐτῶν τὰς ἀμοιβάς, καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐπ´ ἴσης κοινὰ ἀμφοτέροις πρόσεστιν· ἀλλ´ ἐκεῖ μὲν οὐκ ἦν μηδὲν ὠφελῆσθαι τοὺς τὴν ἀτέλειαν ἐσχηκότας· ἃ γὰρ ἐκτήσαντο ἐκ τῆς ἀφέσεως εἰς ἅπαν αὐτοῖς ἔμεινε {ὡς} καὶ τὸν ἄλλον χρόνον ἔμελλον εὐπορώτεροι δι´ αὐτὴν ἔσεσθαι. τοῖς δέ γε τῆς εἰκόνος ἀφαιρεθεῖσιν ἐκ τοῦ τετιμῆσθαι πρότερον οὐδ´ ὁτιοῦν περίεστι δίχα γε τῆς ὕβρεως καὶ τῆς ἀτιμίας. (31,131) πρὸς τούτῳ δὲ ὁ μὲν τιθεὶς τότε τὸν νόμον ἔστιν ὧν κατηγόρει τῶν εἰληφότων τὴν ἀτέλειαν καὶ πονηροὺς ἀπέφαινε τοὺς πλείους, οὐ μόνον ἀναξίους χάριτος· ὥστε τοῦτ´ εἶναι τὸ δεινὸν ὅτι μὴ πᾶσιν ἐγκαλῶν πάντας ἀπεστέρει τὰς δωρεάς. ἐνθάδε δὲ οὐδ´ ἔνεστι τοῖς ἀφελομένοις εἰπεῖν τι κατ´ ἐκείνων· οὓς γὰρ μηδ´ ἴσασι, πῶς αὐτοὺς αἰτιᾶσθαι δυνατόν; (31,132) ἔτι δὲ ὁ μὲν νόμος ἐξαιρέτους τινὰς ἐποίει τοὺς τὰ μέγιστα δοκοῦντας εὐεργετηκέναι τὴν πόλιν, τοὺς ἀφ´ Ἁρμοδίου καὶ Ἀριστογείτονος· ἐνθάδε δὲ οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐξαίρετον. τῷ γὰρ ἀγράφως τὸ πρᾶγμα γίγνεσθαι καὶ μήτε κατὰ νόμον μήτε κατὰ ψήφισμα περὶ οὐδενὸς ὅλως ἀπείρηται, καὶ ἐπὶ παντὶ συμβῆναι δυνατόν ἐστιν, ἐφ´ ὅτῳ ποτὲ ἂν δόξῃ τῷ στρατηγῷ. (31,133) καὶ μὴν ὅ γε νόμος δεινὸν ἐδόκει ποιεῖν ἀφαιρούμενος τοῦ δήμου τὴν ἐξουσίαν, ὥστε μηδὲ τὸ λοιπὸν ἐξεῖναι ψηφίσασθαι τὴν δωρεὰν ταύτην. καὶ πόσῳ κρεῖττον τὴν ἀρχὴν κωλῦσαί τι διδόναι τὸν δῆμον, εἰ μὴ συνέφερε τῇ πόλει, ἢ καταλιπόντα τὸ χαρίζεσθαι τὸ ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ταῦτα ἐφ´ ἑνὶ ποιήσασθαι; {αἰσχροῦ γὰρ ὄντος, ὡς οὐδ´ ἂν εἷς ἀντείποι, τοῦ ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τοὺς λαβόντας τι, κατὰ μὲν τὸν νόμον τοῦτο ἅπαξ ἐγίγνετο, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἔθος ἀεὶ συμβαίνει.} (31,134) καὶ μὴν εἰ δοκεῖ δυσχερὲς τὸ ἀφαιρεῖσθαί τινος ἐξουσίας τὴν πόλιν, καὶ ὑμεῖς ἀφαιρεῖσθε τὴν ἐξουσίαν τοῦ φυλάττειν βέβαια τὰ δοθέντα τοῖς λαβοῦσιν. ὅτῳ γὰρ ἂν ὑμεῖς δῶτε τὴν τιμήν, οὐκέτ´ ἔστ´ ἐφ´ ὑμῖν τὸ ἐᾶν ἔχειν αὐτόν· ἀλλ´ εἷς ἀνὴρ ἀεὶ τούτου κύριος, ὁ στρατηγῶν. καίτοι χεῖρόν ἐστι τὸ ἔθει μὴ ἐφ´ ὑμῖν εἶναι τοῦ κατὰ νόμον κεκωλυμένου. οἱ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἀφῄρηνται τὴν ἐξουσίαν τούτου τρόπον τινά, ὃ πράττειν ἑαυτοὺς νόμῳ κεκωλύκασιν, ἀλλ´ ἀπέστησαν ἑκόντες διὰ τὸ συμφέρον. (31,135) ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ ἔθους οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ὅτι αὑτούς, εἴπερ ἄρα, ἀφῄρηνται τοῦθ´ ὑπὲρ οὗ μήτε ἔκριναν μήτε ἐβουλεύσαντο. καὶ μὴν ἐκεῖ γε παραμυθίαν τινὰ ἔσχον τὸ τοῦ πράγματος ἴσον καὶ κοινόν, ἁπάντων ὁμοίως ἀφαιρουμένων τὰς ἀτελείας, παρ´ ὑμῖν δὲ ὃς ἂν τύχῃ τῆς εἰκόνος ἀφῄρηται καὶ πολλάκις ὁ βελτίων. ἔτι δὲ ἐκεῖ μὲν οὐχ ἵνα ἄλλος λάβῃ, τὸν ἔχοντα ἀφῃρεῖτο ὁ νόμος· παρ´ ὑμῖν δὲ τούτου χάριν γίγνεται, ὃ τῷ παντὶ λυπρότερόν ἐστι τοῦ μόνον ἀποστερεῖσθαι. (31,136) {καὶ μὴν ἐκεῖνό γε οὐδεὶς ἀγνοεῖ δήπουθεν, ὅσῳ δοκεῖ χαλεπώτερον τὸ δι´ ἄλλον τι πάσχειν τοῦ δι´ αὑτόν. οὐκοῦν ἐκ μὲν τοῦ νόμου συνέβαινεν, ἵνα μή τινες ἔχωσι τὰς ἀτελείας, περὶ ὧν ὡς ἀναξίων ἔλεγεν, ἀποδοῦναι τοὺς λοιπούς· ἐκ δὲ τοῦ παρ´ ὑμῖν ἔθους, ἵν´ ἄλλοι λάβωσι, τοὺς ἔχοντας ἀποστερεῖσθαι γίγνεται. (31,137) τῷ παντὶ δὲ τοῦτο τοῖς πάσχουσι βαρύτερον.} εἰ τοίνυν ἐφ´ ὧν μάλιστα ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν, ἐπὶ τούτων βούλοιτό τις ἰδεῖν, τίνας ἀδικεῖ τοῦτο τὸ ἔθος καὶ τίνας ἔμελλε λυπήσειν ἐκεῖνος ὁ νόμος, ἀφελὼν τοὺς μὴ μόνον ἔχοντας ἀτέλειαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς εἰκόνος τετυχηκότας, οὕτω σκοπείτω τοὺς λοιποὺς ἑκατέρων. οὗτοι μὲν γὰρ τρόπον τινὰ οὐδὲ ἔπασχον οὐδέν· ὃ γὰρ εἰλήφεσαν ἐν προσθήκης μέρει, τοῦτο ἀπώλλυον, τῆς μείζονος δωρεᾶς αὐτοῖς τηρουμένης· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἴσος ἂν γένοιτο ὁ λόγος. ἀλλ´ ἔστι μὲν δῆλον καὶ αὐτόθεν οἶμαι τὸ πρᾶγμα· ὅσῳ γὰρ τὸ τῆς εἰκόνος μεῖζον ἢ τὸ τῆς ἀτελείας, τοσούτῳ κρείττονες οἱ τούτου τυχόντες· ἔτι δ´ ἂν οὕτω γένοιτό γε ὁ λόγος φανερώτερος· (31,138) ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀτέλεια τοὺς λαβόντας εὐπορωτέρους ποιεῖ, καὶ οὗτοι μάλιστα ἐπιθυμοῦσιν αὐτῆς οἵτινες ἂν ὦσι περὶ χρήματα ἐσπουδακότες· ἡ δὲ εἰκὼν τὸ σεμνὸν μόνον ἔχει καὶ τὸ τῆς τιμῆς. ὅσῳ δὴ πάντες εἴποιμεν ἂν κρείττους τοὺς προῖκα καὶ δόξης μᾶλλον ἕνεκεν αἱρουμένους εὖ τινας ποιεῖν τῶν ἐπ´ ἀργυρίῳ καὶ διὰ κέρδος, τοσούτῳ φαίην ἂν ἔγωγε οὐ μόνον ἀμείνους ἀνθρώπους ἀδικεῖν τοῦτο τὸ ἔθος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὸ βελτιόνων ὑμᾶς κωλύειν εὖ πάσχειν ἤπερ ἐκείνους ὁ νόμος. (31,139) ἀλλ´ ἔγωγε ἀπορῶ τί δήποτε οὐχὶ καὶ νόμον τίθεσθε ἐπὶ τούτῳ, καθ´ ὃν ἔσται τὸ λοιπόν, εἴπερ ὑμῖν ἀρέσκει. νὴ Δί´, αἰσχύνην γὰρ οὐ μικρὰν ἔχει νόμος τοιοῦτος ἐν τῇ πόλει κείμενος. εἶτα ὃ γράφειν αἰσχρὸν ἡγεῖσθε, τοῦτο ποιεῖν οὐκ αἰσχρόν ἐστι; καὶ πόσῳ κρεῖττον μὴ χρῆσθαί τισι τῶν φαύλως γεγραμμένων ἢ ποιεῖν; ἢ ποτέρους ἂν εἴποιτε βελτίους, τοὺς οὕτως ἔχοντας πρὸς τὰ ἄτοπα, ὥστε ἀπέχεσθαι καὶ δεδομένων, ἢ τοὺς οὐ συγκεχωρημένα πράττοντας;

[31,130] However, as to any attempt to show that the city is insincere, is faithless in its gifts, and that it wrongs its benefactors by robbing them of their rewards — such reproaches apply in all respects equally to both Athens and Rhodes. But whereas at Athens those who had formerly received exemption from public burdens could not possibly have received no benefit at all — for whatever they had previously acquired (p137) from the immunity remained theirs in every respect for the future as for the past, and they could not fail to be better off on account of it; those, on the other hand, who have had their statues taken away from them have nothing left over from the honour they had formerly enjoyed — except the insult and the dishonour. 131 And, in addition, the Athenian who, on the occasion I have mentioned, proposed the law attacked a considerable number of those who had received exemption from public duties and tried to show that the majority of them were knaves, not merely unworthy of any favour, so that the unfairness of it was that, while not accusing all, he was proposing to deprive all of their gifts. But in Rhodes here it is utterly impossible for those who have deprived men of their statues to say anything against them; for when they do not even know who the original recipients were, as they admit, how is it possible to bring a charge against them? 132 Furthermore, that law proposed to make an exception in favour of those who were regarded as having conferred the greatest benefactions upon the city, to wit, the descendants of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, but here no exception is made. For since the practice is carried on without any record being kept and is not regulated by either law or decree, absolutely no concession is made for anyone, and this indignity may happen to anyone at the pleasure of the chief magistrate at any time. 133 Again, the Athenian law was thought to be committing an outrage in depriving the people of their authority in the matter, so that not even in the future would it be possible for them to vote (p139) this gift. Yet how much better to prevent the people from granting any honour or any privilege than, while leaving the right to confer a favour, to place the power of taking it away in the hands of one man! For while it is disgraceful, as no man would deny, to take any gift away from those who have received it, according to that Athenian law this was happening just once, but according to this Rhodian custom it takes place all the time! 134 Besides, if it appears vexatious that your city should be deprived of any power, it is you your own selves who are depriving it of the power to guarantee for the recipients the security of its gifts. For whenever you confer this honour upon a man, it is no longer in your power to allow him to keep it; on the contrary, one official always has this in his control, namely, the chief magistrate. And yet, it is worse for you to lack this power owing to custom than to be estopped by law. For in the one case men in a certain sense have not been deprived of the control of that which they have by law renounced their right willingly because of the advantage thereby gained. 135 But when we have to deal with a custom, one cannot even say that men have deprived themselves — if deprived they have been — of a thing on which they have neither passed judgment nor deliberated. And although in Athens the people had some consolation — in that the measure was impartial and general, since all alike were being deprived of their exemption from public burdens — here it is only the recipient of the statue who has been deprived of it, (p141) and often he is the better man. Moreover, in Athens it was not in order that another person might receive the exemption that the law proposed to take it away from the possessor, but in your city that is precisely why it is done, a thing that is altogether more distressing than merely to be dispossessed. 136 Furthermore, no one, I presume, is unaware how much more grievous it seems to suffer any harsh treatment on account of another than it is to suffer it on your own account. So, whereas it was the intention of the Athenian law to divest all others of their privilege of exemption in order to prevent certain men, whom it designated as undeserving, from retaining theirs, the result of your custom is that the owners of statues are robbed of them in order that others may receive them; 137 and this treatment is altogether more grievous to those affected. If, further, any one wishes, confining his consideration of the matter strictly to those cases in which the loss suffered is most nearly irreparable, to ask who are being wronged by this custom of yours and who were bound to be hurt by that Athenian law, let him disregard, not only those who were enjoying exemption from public burdens there, but also those who have received a statue here, and then let him consider those who are not in either class. Since those who had been honoured at Athens were in a sense not suffering any loss at all, for it was only what they would have received (p143) by way of a supplement that they were losing, whereas the greater gift continued to be theirs; but as regards the other gifts, the reckoning would come out the same for both classes. But, I think, the case is quite self-evident: For in proportion as the grant of a statue is a greater honour than the exemption, in just that degree those who receive the former are superior men. The argument can be made still clearer, though, if stated thus: 138 Whereas the exemption from public burdens makes the recipients of it wealthier, and those men are especially eager for it who are interested in money-making, the statue implies only dignity and honour; so just in proportion as those are superior men, as we would all agree, who choose to confer benefits upon others without remuneration and rather for reputation's sake than those who set a price upon it and are moved by desire for gain, by just so much, as I at least would assert, are not only they better men whom this custom of yours wrongs, but also by just so much are those persons whom you are preventing from conferring benefits upon yourselves superior to those whom the Athenian laws prevented from benefitting the Athenians. 139 But for my part I am at a loss to understand why on earth you do not pass a law on this matter to regulate it for the future, if such is your pleasure. "Good heavens!" you exclaim, "Why, the existence of a law like that in a city brings no little shame." And so it is not disgraceful to do what you (p145) think it is disgraceful to enact in writing? And yet how much better it is to refrain from following any written laws which are badly conceived than to do bad things! Or what class of men would you call the better, those who are so disposed toward improper things that they refrain from doing them even when they are authorized, or those who do them even though they are not allowed?