[15,20] Ἴσως γὰρ οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι παρὰ πολλοῖς καὶ σφόδρα εὐνομουμένοις ταῦτα ἃ λέγεις ἔξεστι τοῖς πατράσι περὶ τοὺς υἱέας, καὶ δὴ καί, ἐὰν βούλωνται, καὶ ἀποδίδοσθαι, καὶ τὸ ἔτι τούτων χαλεπώτερον· ἐφεῖται γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἀποκτεῖναι μήτε κρίναντας μήτε ὅλως αἰτιασαμένους· ἀλλ´ ὅμως οὐδὲν ἧττον οὐ δοῦλοί εἰσι τῶν πατέρων, ἀλλὰ υἱεῖς. εἰ δὲ δὴ ὅτι μάλιστα ἐδούλευον καὶ δοῦλος ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπῆρχον δικαίως, τί με, ἔφη, κωλύει νῦν ἐλεύθερον εἶναι μηδενὸς ἔλαττον, σὲ δὲ αὖ τοὐναντίον, εἰ καὶ σφόδρα ἐξ ἐλευθέρων ἦσθα, δοῦλον εἶναι παντὸς μᾶλλον; (15,21) Ἐγὼ μέν, εἶπεν, οὐχ ὁρῶ ὅπως ἐλεύθερος ὢν δοῦλος ἔσομαι· σὲ δὲ οὐκ ἀδύνατον ἐλεύθερον γεγονέναι, ἀφέντος τοῦ δεσπότου. Τί δέ, ὦ λῷστε, ἔφη, οὐθεὶς ἂν γένοιτο ἐλεύθερος μὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσπότου ἀφεθείς; Πῶς γάρ; εἶπεν. Ὅπως Ἀθηναίων ψηφισαμένων μετὰ τὴν ἐν Χαιρωνείᾳ μάχην τοὺς συμπολεμήσοντας οἰκέτας ἐλευθέρους εἶναι, εἰ προὔβη ὁ πόλεμος, ἀλλὰ μὴ διελύσατο θᾶττον ὁ Φίλιππος πρὸς αὐτούς, πολλοὶ ἂν τῶν Ἀθήνησιν οἰκετῶν ἢ μικροῦ πάντες ἐλεύθεροι ἦσαν, οὐχ ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσπότου ἕκαστος ἀφεθείς. Ἔστω τοῦτό γε, εἰ δημοσίᾳ σε ἡ πόλις ἐλευθερώσει. (15,22) Τί δέ; ἐμαυτὸν οὐκ ἄν σοι δοκῶ ἐλευθερῶσαι; Εἴ γε ἀργύριόν ποθεν καταβάλοις τῷ δεσπότῃ. Οὐ τοῦτόν φημι τὸν τρόπον, ἀλλὰ ὅνπερ Κῦρος οὐ μόνον ἑαυτόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ Πέρσας ἅπαντας ἠλευθέρωσε, τοσοῦτον ὄχλον, οὔτε ἀργύριον οὐδενὶ καταβαλὼν οὔτε ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσπότου ἀφεθείς. ἢ οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι λυχνοποιὸς ἦν Κῦρος Ἀστυάγους, καὶ ὁπότε γ´ ἐνεθυμήθη καὶ ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ, ἐλεύθερος ἅμα καὶ βασιλεὺς ἐγένετο τῆς Ἀσίας ἁπάσης; (15,23) Εἶεν· ἐμὲ δὲ πῶς φῂς δοῦλον ἂν γενέσθαι; Ὅτι μυρίοι δήπου ἀποδίδονται ἑαυτοὺς ἐλεύθεροι ὄντες, ὥστε δουλεύειν κατὰ συγγραφὴν ἐνίοτε ἐπ´ οὐδενὶ τῶν μετρίων, ἀλλ´ ἐπὶ πᾶσι τοῖς χαλεπωτάτοις. Τέως μὲν οὖν προσεῖχον τοῖς λόγοις οἱ παρόντες, ὡς οὐ μετὰ σπουδῆς λεγομένοις μᾶλλον ἢ μετὰ παιδιᾶς· ὕστερον δὲ ἐφιλονίκουν, καὶ ἐδόκει ἄτοπον εἶναι, εἰ μηδὲν ἔσται εἰπεῖν τεκμήριον, ᾧ τις ἀναμφιλόγως διακρινεῖ τὸν δοῦλον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐλευθέρου, (15,24) ἀλλ´ εὐμαρὲς ἔσοιτο περὶ παντὸς ἀμφισβητεῖν καὶ ἀντιλέγειν. ἀφέντες οὖν ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου σκοπεῖν καὶ τῆς ἐκείνου δουλείας ἐσκόπουν ὅστις εἴη δοῦλος. καὶ ἐδόκει αὐτοῖς, ὃν ἄν τις 〈ᾖ〉 κεκτημένος κυρίως, ὥσπερ ἄλλο τι τῶν αὑτοῦ χρημάτων ἢ βοσκημάτων, ὥστε ἐξεῖναι αὐτῷ χρῆσθαι ὅ,τι βούλεται, οὗτος ὀρθῶς λέγεσθαί τε καὶ εἶναι δοῦλος τοῦ κεκτημένου. πάλιν οὖν ἠμφεσβήτει ὁ περὶ τῆς δουλείας ἀντιλέγων ὅ,τι ποτὲ εἴη τὸ κύριον τῆς κτήσεως. (15,25) καὶ γὰρ οἰκίαν καὶ χωρίον καὶ ἵππον καὶ βοῦν πολλοὺς ἤδη φανῆναι τῶν κεκτημένων πολὺν χρόνον οὐ δικαίως ἔχοντας, ἐνίους δὲ καὶ παρὰ τῶν πατέρων παρειληφότας· οὕτως δὴ καὶ ἄνθρωπον εἶναι ἀδίκως κεκτῆσθαι. καὶ γὰρ δὴ τῶν κτωμένων {εἶναι} τοὺς οἰκέτας, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ξύμπαντα, οἱ μὲν παρ´ ἄλλων λαμβάνουσιν ἢ χαρισαμένου τινὸς ἢ κληρονομήσαντες ἢ πριάμενοι, τινὲς δὲ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τοὺς παρὰ σφίσι γεννηθέντας, οὓς οἰκογενεῖς καλοῦσιν. τρίτος δὲ κτήσεως τρόπος, ὅταν ἐν πολέμῳ λαβὼν αἰχμάλωτον ἢ καὶ ληϊσάμενος, κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἔχῃ καταδουλωσάμενος, ὅσπερ οἶμαι πρεσβύτατος ἁπάντων ἐστίν. τοὺς γὰρ πρώτους γενομένους δούλους οὐκ εἰκὸς ἐκ δούλων φῦναι τὴν ἀρχήν, ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ λῃστείας ἢ πολέμῳ (15,16) κρατηθέντας οὕτως ἀναγκασθῆναι δουλεύειν τοῖς λαβοῦσιν. οὐκοῦν οὗτος ὁ παλαιότατος τρόπος, ἐξ οὗ πάντες οἱ λοιποὶ ἤρτηνται, σφόδρα ἀσθενὴς καὶ οὐδὲν ἔχων ἰσχυρόν· ὅταν γάρ ποτε δυνηθῶσιν ἐκεῖνοι πάλιν ἀποφυγεῖν, οὐδὲν κωλύει ἐλευθέρους εἶναι αὐτούς, ὡς ἀδίκως δουλεύοντας· ὥστε οὐδὲ πρότερόν ποτε δοῦλοι ἦσαν. ἐνίοτε δὲ οὐ μόνον αὐτοὶ ἀπέφυγον τὴν δουλείαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς δεσπότας κατεδουλώσαντο. κἀνταῦθα ἤδη, φασίν, ὀστράκου μεταπεσόντος ἅπαν γίγνεται τοὐναντίον τῶν πρότερον. εἶπεν οὖν τις τῶν παρόντων ὅτι ἐκεῖνοι μὲν αὐτοὶ ἴσως οὐκ ἂν λέγοιντο δοῦλοι, τοῖς δὲ ἐξ ἐκείνων γενομένοις καὶ τοῖς δευτέροις καὶ τοῖς τρίτοις κυρίως ἂν ἤδη προσήκοι τοῦ ὀνόματος. Καὶ πῶς; (15,27) εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἁλῶναι ποιεῖ δουλεύειν, αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἑαλωκόσι μᾶλλον τούτου προσήκοι ἂν ἢ τοῖς ἐξ ἐκείνων· εἰ δὲ τὸ ἐκ δούλων γεγονέναι, δῆλον ὅτι ἐξ ἐλευθέρων ὄντες τῶν ἑαλωκότων οἱ μετ´ αὐτοὺς οὐκ ἂν εἶεν οἰκέται. καὶ γὰρ δὴ ὁρῶμεν ἐκείνους Μεσσηνίους, δι´ ὅσων ἐτῶν οὐ μόνον τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν χώραν ἐκομίσαντο τὴν αὑτῶν. (15,28) ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἡττήθησαν ἐν Λεύκτροις ὑπὸ Θηβαίων Λακεδαιμόνιοι, στρατεύσαντες εἰς Πελοπόννησον Θηβαῖοι μετὰ τῶν συμμάχων ἠνάγκασαν τήν τε χώραν τὴν Μεσσηνίαν ἀποδοῦναι Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ ὅσοι ἦσαν ἀπ´ ἐκείνων γεγονότες, δουλεύοντας πρότερον παρὰ Λακεδαιμονίοις, τοὺς Εἴλωτας λεγομένους, κατῴκισαν πάλιν εἰς Μεσσήνην. καὶ ταῦτα οὐδείς φησιν ἀδίκως πεποιηκέναι τοὺς Θηβαίους, ἀλλὰ παγκάλως καὶ δικαίως. ὥστε εἴπερ οὗτος ὁ τρόπος οὐ δίκαιός ἐστι τῆς κτήσεως, ἐξ οὗ πάντες οἱ λοιποὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχουσι, κινδυνεύει μηδὲ ἄλλος μηθεὶς εἶναι, μηδὲ τῷ ὄντι κατ´ ἀλήθειαν δοῦλος λέγεσθαι. (15,29) ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐχ οὕτως ᾖ λεγόμενος ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὁ δοῦλος, ὑπὲρ ὅτου ἀργύριόν τις τοῦ σώματος κατέβαλεν ἢ ὃς ἂν ἐκ δούλων λεγομένων ᾖ γεγονώς, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζουσι, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον ὅσπερ ἀνελεύθερος καὶ δουλοπρεπής. τῶν μὲν γὰρ λεγομένων δούλων πολλοὺς ὁμολογήσομεν δήπου εἶναι ἐλευθερίους, τῶν δέ γε ἐλευθέρων πολλοὺς πάνυ δουλοπρεπεῖς. ἔστι δὲ ὡς περὶ τοὺς γενναίους καὶ τοὺς εὐγενεῖς. τούτους γὰρ οἱ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὠνόμασαν τοὺς εὖ γεγονότας πρὸς ἀρετήν, οὐδὲν πολυπραγμονοῦντες ἐκ τίνων εἰσίν· ὕστερον δὲ οἱ ἐκ τῶν πάλαι πλουσίων καὶ τῶν ἐνδόξων ὑπό τινων εὐγενεῖς ἐκλήθησαν.

[15,20] A. "Yes, but perhaps you do not know that in many states which have exceedingly good laws fathers have all these powers which you mention in regard to their sons, and what is more, if they wish to do so, they may even imprison or sell them; and they have a power even more terrible than any of these; for they actually are allowed to put their sons to death without any trial and even without bringing any accusation at all against them; but still none the less they are not their fathers' slaves but their sons. And even if I was once in a state of slavery in the (p163) fullest sense of the term and had been a slave justly from the very beginning, what is to prevent me now," he continued, "from being just as free as anybody else, and you in your turn, on the contrary, even if you most indisputably were the son of free parents, from being an out-and-out slave?" 21 B. "For my part," rejoined the other, "I do not see how I am to become a slave when, in fact, I am free; but as for you, it is not impossible that you have become free by your master's having emancipated you." A. "See here, my good fellow," said his antagonist, "would nobody get his freedom unless emancipated by his owner?" B. "Why, how could anybody?" asked the other. A. "In the same way that, when the Athenians after the battle of Chaeronea passed a vote to the effect that those slaves who would help them in the war should receive their freedom, if the war had continued and Philip had not made peace with them too soon, many of the slaves at Athens, or rather, practically all of them, would have been free without having been emancipated one at a time by their respective masters." B. "Yes, let that be granted — if the state is going to free you by taking official action." 22 A. "But what have you to say to this: Do you not think that I could liberate myself?" B. "Yes, if you should raise the money somewhere to pay your master with." A. "That is not the method I mean, but the one by which Cyrus freed not only himself but also all the Persians, great host that they were, without paying down money to anyone or being set free by any master. (p165) Or do you not know that Cyrus was the vassal of Astyages and that when he got the power and decided that the time was ripe for action, he became both free and king of all Asia?" B. "Granted; I know it. But what do you mean by saying that I might become a slave?" 23 A. "I mean that great numbers of men, we may suppose, who are free-born sell themselves, so that they are slaves by contract, sometimes on no easy terms but the most severe imaginable." Now up to this point the audience paid attention to their arguments, under the impression that they were not made so much in earnest as in jest. Yet afterwards they fell to wrangling and were inclined to the opinion that it was a strange thing if it was going to be impossible for a man to cite any evidence by which the slave could be unequivocally distinguished from the free man, but that it would be easy to debate and argue about every individual case. 24 So they dropped their discussion about the particular man in question and his slavery, and proceeded to consider the general question: Who is a slave. And the consensus of their opinion was that when anyone gets possession of a human being, in the strict meaning of the term, just as he might of any item of his goods or cattle, so as to have the right to use him as he likes, then that man is both correctly called and in fact is the slave of the man into whose possession he has come. Consequently, the man who had objected to being (p167) called a slave raised the further question as to what constituted the validity of possession. 25 For, he said, in the case of a house, a plot of land, a horse, or a cow, many of those who had possession had in the past been found to have held them for a long time unjustly, in some instances even though they had inherited the things from their fathers. In precisely the same way it was possible, he maintained, to have gained possession also of a human being unjustly. For manifestly of those who from time to time acquire slaves, as they acquire all other pieces of property, some get them from others either as a free gift from someone or by inheritance or by purchase, whereas some few from the very beginning have possession of those who were born under their roof, 'home-bred' slaves as they call them. A third method of acquiring possession is when a man takes a prisoner in war or even in brigandage and in this way holds the man after enslaving him, the oldest method of all, I presume. For it is not likely that the first men to become slaves were born of slaves in the first place, but that they were overpowered in brigandage or war and thus compelled to be slaves to their captors. 26 So we see that this earliest method, upon which all the others depend, is exceedingly vulnerable and has no validity at all; for just as soon as those men are able to make their escape, there is nothing to prevent them from being free as having been in servitude unjustly. Consequently, they were not slaves before that, either. And sometimes they not only escaped from slavery themselves, but also reduced their masters to (p169) slavery. In this case, also, we have now found that 'at the flip of a shell,' as the saying goes, their positions are completely reversed. At this point one of the audience interjected that while those men themselves perhaps could not be called slaves, yet their children and those of the second and third generations could quite properly be so designated. 27 "But how can that be? For if being captured makes a man a slave, the men who themselves were captured deserve that appellation more than their descendants do; and if it is having been born of slaves that makes men so, it is clear that by virtue of being sprung from those who were taken captive and were consequently free-born, their descendants would not be slaves. For instance, we see that those famous Messenians after the lapse of so many years recovered not only their freedom but their territory as well. 28 For when the Spartans were defeated at Leuctra by the Thebans, the latter marched into the Peloponnese supported by their allies, and not only compelled the Spartans to give back the Messenian territory, but settled in Messene again all the original Messenians' descendants, the Helots as they were called, who had previously been in servitude to the Spartans. And not a man says that the Thebans therein acted unjustly, but all agree that altogether nobly and justly. Consequently, if this method of gaining possession, from which all the others take their beginning, is not just, it is likely that no other one is either, and that the term 'slave' does not in reality correspond to the truth. (p171) 29 "But perhaps it was not in this way that the term 'slave' was originally applied — that is, to a person for whose body someone paid money, or, as the majority think, to one who was sprung from persons who were called slaves, but rather to the man who lacked a free man's spirit and was of a servile nature. For of those who are called slaves we will, I presume, admit that many have the spirit of free men, and that among free men there are many who are altogether servile. The case is the same with those known as 'noble' and 'well-born.' For those who originally applied these names applied them to persons who were well-born in respect to virtue or excellence, not bothering to inquire who their parents were. Then afterwards the descendants of families of ancient wealth and high repute were called 'well-born' by a certain class.