[14,10] τί δή; ἆρά γε συμφέρει τῷ δεσπότῃ τὸ τεθνάναι τὸν οἰκέτην ἢ νοσεῖν ἢ πονηρὸν εἶναι; οὐδεὶς ἂν εἴποι, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον οἶμαι τό τε ζῆν καὶ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ χρηστὸν εἶναι. τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ ταῦτα φανεῖται καὶ τῷ οἰκέτῃ συμφέροντα· ὥστε καὶ τῷ οἰκέτῃ· ὁ δεσπότης οὐδὲν ἧττον, ἄνπερ ἔχῃ νοῦν, τὰ συμφέροντα ἐκείνῳ προστάξει· ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ αὐτῷ φαίνεται συμφέρειν. (14,11) ἀλλὰ ὑπὲρ ὅτου ἄν τις ἀργύριον καταβάλῃ, οὗτος ἐξ ἀνάγκης δοῦλός ἐστιν. οὔκουν πολλοὶ περὶ πολλῶν καὶ ἐλευθέρων καταβεβλήκασιν ἀργύριον, οἱ μὲν πολεμίοις, οἱ δὲ λῃσταῖς λύτρα διδόντες, οἱ δέ τινες τὴν αὑτῶν τιμὴν καταβεβλήκασι τοῖς δεσπόταις; καὶ οὐ δήπου δοῦλοί εἰσιν οὗτοι αὐτῶν. (14,12) ἀλλὰ μὴν ὃν ἂν ἐξῇ ἑτέρῳ μαστιγῶσαι καὶ δῆσαι καὶ ἀνελεῖν καὶ ἄλλο ὅ,τι ἂν βούληται ἐργάσασθαι, οὗτος ἐκείνου δοῦλός ἐστιν. τί δέ; οὐκ ἔξεστι τοῖς λῃσταῖς ταῦτα ποιεῖν τοὺς ληφθέντας; καὶ οὐδὲν ἧττον οὐ δοῦλοί εἰσιν. τί δέ; τοῖς δικασταῖς οὐκ ἔξεστι τιμᾶν καὶ δεσμοῦ καὶ θανάτου καὶ ἄλλου ὅτου ἂν βούλωνται πολλοῖς τῶν κρινομένων; καὶ οὐ δήπου δοῦλοί εἰσιν οὗτοι. εἰ δὲ μίαν ἡμέραν, ἐν ᾗ κρίνεται ἕκαστος, οὐδὲν τοῦτο· καὶ γὰρ μίαν ἡμέραν ἤδη τις λέγεται γενέσθαι δοῦλος. (14,13) ‘Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἑνὶ λόγῳ συλλαβόντα χρὴ ἀποφήνασθαι ὡς ὅτῳ μὲν ἔξεστιν ὃ βούλεται πράττειν, ἐλεύθερός ἐστιν, ὅτῳ δὲ μὴ ἔξεστι, δοῦλος’. οὐ δὴ ἐπὶ τῶν πλεόντων οὐδὲ τῶν καμνόντων οὐδὲ τῶν στρατευομένων οὐδὲ τῶν μανθανόντων γράμματα ἢ κιθαρίζειν ἢ παλαίειν ἢ ἄλλην τινὰ τέχνην ἐρεῖς αὐτό· οὐ γὰρ ἔξεστι τούτοις πράττειν ὡς αὐτοὶ ἐθέλουσιν, ἀλλ´ ὡς ὅ τε κυβερνήτης καὶ ἰατρὸς καὶ διδάσκαλος προστάττει. οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔξεστιν ἃ ἐθέλουσι ποιεῖν, ἀλλ´ ἐάν τις παρὰ τοὺς νόμους τοὺς κειμένους πράττῃ, ζημιώσεται. (14,14) Οὐκοῦν ὅσα μὴ ἀπείρηται ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων μηδὲ προστέτακται, ὁ περὶ τούτων ἔχων αὐτὸς τὴν ἐξουσίαν τοῦ πράττειν ὡς βούλεται ἢ μὴ ἐλεύθερος, ὁ δὲ τοὐναντίον ἀδύνατος δοῦλος. Τί δέ; οἴει σοι ἐξεῖναι, ὅσα μὴ ἀπείρηται μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων ἐγγράφως, αἰσχρὰ δὲ ἄλλως δοκεῖ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἄτοπα· λέγω δὲ οἷον τελωνεῖν ἢ πορνοβοσκεῖν ἢ ἄλλα ὅμοια πράττειν; Οὐ μὰ Δία φαίην ἂν οὐδὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐξεῖναι τοῖς ἐλευθέροις. καὶ γὰρ περὶ τούτων ἐπίκειται ζημία τὸ μισεῖσθαι ἢ δυσχεραίνεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. (14,15) Τί δέ; τοῖς ἀκολάστοις ἀνθρώποις, ὅσα ποιοῦσι διὰ τὴν ἀκολασίαν, καὶ τοῖς ἀνοήτοις, ὅσα διὰ τὴν ἄνοιαν, ἢ οὐσίας ἀμελοῦντες ἢ σώματος ἢ ἀδίκως καὶ ἀγνωμόνως προσφερόμενοι ἀλλήλοις, οὐ πάντα ταῦτα ἐπιζήμια τοῖς ποιοῦσίν ἐστιν; ἢ γὰρ εἰς τὸ σῶμα ἢ τὴν οὐσίαν ἢ τὸ μέγιστον τὴν ψυχὴν τὴν αὑτῶν βλάπτονται. Τοῦτο μὲν ἀληθὲς λέγεις. Οὔκουν οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἔξεστι πράττειν; (14,16) Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. Ἑνὶ δὴ λόγῳ τὰ μὲν φαῦλα καὶ ἄτοπα καὶ ἀσύμφορα οὐκ ἔξεστι πράττειν, τὰ δὲ δίκαια καὶ συμφέροντα καὶ ἀγαθὰ χρὴ φάναι ὅτι προσήκει τε καὶ ἔξεστιν; Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ. Οὐκοῦν οὐδενὶ τά τε φαῦλα καὶ ἀσύμφορα ποιεῖν ἀζήμιόν ἐστιν οὔτε Ἕλληνι οὔτε βαρβάρῳ οὔτε ὑπὲρ ὅτου τις τιμὴν δέδωκεν ἀργύριον; Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. Τὰ δέ γε ἐναντία πᾶσιν ὁμοίως ἐφεῖται, καὶ οἱ μὲν τὰ ἐφειμένα πράττοντες ἀζήμιοι διατελοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ τὰ κεκωλυμένα ζημιοῦνται. (14,17) ἄλλοι οὖν δοκοῦσί σοι πράττειν ἃ ἔξεστιν ἢ οἱ ἐπιστάμενοι ταῦτα, καὶ ἄλλοι τἀναντία ἢ οἱ ἀγνοοῦντες; Οὐδαμῶς. Οὐκοῦν οἱ φρόνιμοι ὅσα βούλονται πράττειν, ἔξεστιν αὐτοῖς· οἱ δὲ ἄφρονες ὅσα βούλονται οὐκ ἐξὸν ἐπιχειροῦσι πράττειν· ὥστε ἀνάγκη τοὺς μὲν φρονίμους ἐλευθέρους τε εἶναι καὶ ἐξεῖναι αὐτοῖς ποιεῖν ὡς ἐθέλουσι, τοὺς δὲ ἀνοήτους δούλους τε εἶναι καὶ ἃ μὴ ἔξεστιν αὐτοῖς, ταῦτα ποιεῖν; Ἴσως. (14,18) Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν χρὴ λέγειν ἐπιστήμην τῶν ἐφειμένων καὶ τῶν κεκωλυμένων, τὴν δὲ δουλείαν ἄγνοιαν ὧν τε ἔξεστι καὶ ὧν μή. ἐκ δὲ τούτου τοῦ λόγου οὐδὲν ἂν κωλύοι τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα πάνυ μεγάλην τιάραν ἐπὶ τῆς κεφαλῆς ἔχοντα δοῦλον εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἐξεῖναι αὐτῷ πράττειν μηδὲν ὧν ποιεῖ· πάντα γὰρ ἐπιζημίως καὶ ἀσυμφόρως πράξει. ἄλλον δέ τινα δοῦλον δοκοῦντα καὶ ὀνομαζόμενον, οὐχ ἅπαξ, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις, ἂν οὕτω τύχῃ, πεπραμένον, εἰ δὲ ἄρα τοῦτο συμβαίνοι, πέδας πάνυ παχείας ἔχοντα, μᾶλλον ἐλεύθερον εἶναι τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως. (14,19) Ἐμοὶ μὲν σφόδρα δοκεῖ ἄτοπον, εἰ πέδας ἔχων τις ἢ ἐστιγμένος ἢ ἐν μυλῶνι ἀλῶν ἐλεύθερος ἔσται μᾶλλον τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως. Τί δέ; ἐν Θρᾴκῃ γέγονας; Ἔγωγε. Ἑώρακας οὖν ἐκεῖ τὰς γυναῖκας τὰς ἐλευθέρας στιγμάτων μεστάς, καὶ τοσούτῳ πλείονα ἐχούσας στίγματα καὶ ποικιλώτερα ὅσῳ ἂν βελτίους καὶ ἐκ βελτιόνων δοκῶσιν; Τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτο; Ὅτι βασίλισσαν, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐδὲν κωλύει ἐστιγμένην εἶναι, βασιλέα δὲ οἴει κωλύειν;

[14,10] 10 Well then, is it to the master's advantage that his servant should die or be ill or be a knave? No one would say so, but would affirm that the contrary is to his advantage, namely that he should keep alive and well and should be an honest man. And these same things will be found to be for the advantage of the servant as well; so that the master, if indeed he is wise, will order his servant to do that which is equally to the servant's advantage; for that will prove to be of advantage to himself as well. 11 — But the man for whom one pays down money is of necessity a slave. (Dion) But have not many men paid down money for many who are free, when they have paid a ransom, at one time to enemies in warfare and at another to pirates, and some few have paid their own value to their masters? And yet surely these last are not slaves to themselves? 12 — No, but whenever another has the power to have a man scourged or imprisoned or put to death, or have anything else done to him that he wishes, then that man is the slave of the other. (Dion) How is that? Do not pirates have the power to treat the men they have captured in this way? And yet none the less the captives are not slaves. Then again, have not judges the power to impose (p133) the penalty of imprisonment or death or anything else they wish upon many of those who are before them for trial? And yet surely these men are not slaves. But if they are slaves for the one day during which they each are on trial, this means nothing; for is a man really ever said to have been a slave for one day? 13 — But surely we may put the matter briefly and declare that whoever has the power to do whatever he wishes is free, and that whoever has not that power is a slave. (Dion) No, you cannot say this in the case of those on board ship nor of the sick either, nor of those serving in the field, nor of those learning to read and write or to play the harp or to wrestle or to acquire any other art; for these have not the right to follow their own preferences, but must act as the captain, physician, or teacher, as the case may be, instructs. If that is so, then men in general are not allowed to do what they wish, but if they violate the established laws, they will be punished. 14 — Then I say that the man who has the power to act or not, just as he pleases, in regard to those matters which are not forbidden by the laws or enjoined by them, is free, and that the man who on the contrary lacks that power is a slave. (Dion) Well then, do you think that it is permitted to you to do all things, which, while they are not expressly forbidden by the laws, yet are regarded as base and unseemly by mankind? I mean, for example, collecting taxes, or keeping a brothel, or doing other such things. — O no, indeed. I should say that it is not permissible for the free to do such things either. And (p135) indeed for these acts the penalty fixed is to be hated or abominated by men. 15 (Dion) Well then, in the case of intemperate men, whatever acts they commit by reason of their intemperance, and in the case of the ignorant all that they do owing to their ignorance in neglecting either their property or their person or in treating their fellows unjustly and inconsiderately, do not all these things impose a penalty upon those that do them? For they are injured either in their person or in their property or, most serious of all, in their own soul. — What you now say is true. (Dion) Therefore it is not permissible to do these things either? — No, certainly not. 16 (Dion) In a word, then, it is not permissible to do mean and unseemly and unprofitable things, but things that are just and profitable and good we must say that it is both proper and permissible to do? — It seems so to me at any rate. (Dion) Therefore no one may do that which is mean and unprofitable without suffering the penalty, whether he be Greek or barbarian --- or a man for whom one has paid a price in cash? — No, indeed. (Dion) But the opposite things are allowed to all alike, and those who do what is allowed continue free from penalty, while those who do what is forbidden are punished. 17 Now do you think that any others do what is permissible except those who know what that is, or that any others do the opposite except those who do not know? — Oh, no! (p137) (Dion) Therefore, the wise are permitted to do anything whatsoever they wish, while the foolish attempt to do what they wish although it is not permissible; so that it follows of necessity that while the wise are free and are allowed to act as they wish, the ignorant are slaves and do that which is not allowable for them? — Perhaps. 18 (Dion) Therefore we are forced to define freedom as the knowledge of what is allowable and what is forbidden, and slavery as ignorance of what is allowed and what is not. According to this definition there is nothing to prevent the Great King, while wearing a very tall tiara upon his head, from being a slave and not being allowed to do anything that he does; for every act that he performs will bring a penalty and be unprofitable. But some other man who is regarded as a slave and is so called, who has not once but often, if it so chance, been sold, and if it should so happen, wears very heavy fetters, will be more free than the Great King. 19 — To me it appears exceeding strange that one who wears fetters or has been branded or who grinds in a mill will be more free than the Great King. (Dion) Well, now have you ever been in Thrace? — Yes. (Dion) Then you have seen the women there, the free women, covered with branded marks, and having the more such marks and the more elaborate in proportion to their social standing and that of the families to which they belong? (p139) — Now, pray, what does this signify?