[5,71] Μετὰ τοῦτο πολλὴ ζήτησις ἐνέπιπτε τοῖς προεστηκόσι τῆς βουλῆς καὶ πρόνοια περὶ τοῦ παραληψομένου τὴν ἡγεμονίαν. ἐδόκει γὰρ αὐτοῖς δραστηρίου τ´ ἀνδρὸς εἰς τὰ πράγματα δεῖν καὶ πολλὴν τῶν πολεμικῶν ἀγώνων ἐμπειρίαν ἔχοντος, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις φρονίμου τε καὶ σώφρονος καὶ μηδὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ μεγέθους τῆς ἐξουσίας ἐπὶ τὸ ἀνόητον παραχθησομένου· ὑπὲρ ἅπαντα δὲ ταῦτα καὶ τἆλλα ὅσα δεῖ προσεῖναι στρατηλάταις ἀγαθοῖς ἄρχειν ἐγκρατῶς εἰδότος καὶ μηθὲν μαλακὸν ἐνδώσοντος τοῖς ἀπειθοῦσιν, οὗ μάλιστα ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἐδέοντο. ἅπαντα δ´ ὁρῶντες ὅσα ἠξίουν περὶ τὸν ἕτερον ὑπάρχοντα τῶν ὑπάτων Τῖτον Λάρκιον· ὁ γὰρ Κλοίλιος ἐν ταῖς πολιτικαῖς χρείαις διάφορος ὢν τὸ δραστήριον καὶ φιλοπόλεμον οὐκ εἶχεν, οὐδέ γε τὸ ἀρχικὸν καὶ φοβερόν, ἀλλ´ ἐπιεικὴς τιμωρὸς ἦν τῶν ἀπειθούντων· ἡ δὲ βουλὴ δι´ αἰσχύνης ἐλάμβανον τοῦ μὲν ἀφελέσθαι τὴν ἀρχήν, ἣν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους εἶχε, τῷ δὲ χαρίσασθαι τὴν ἀμφοτέρων ἐξουσίαν, μείζονα βασιλικοῦ σχήματος γινομένην· καί τι καὶ δέος αὐτὴν ὑπῄει, μὴ βαρεῖαν ὁ Κλοίλιος ἡγησάμενος τὴν ἀπαξίωσιν τῆς ἀρχῆς ὡς ἠτιμασμένος ὑπὸ τῆς βουλῆς ἔπειτα μεταθῆται τὴν προαίρεσιν τοῦ βίου τοῦ δήμου γενόμενος προστάτης καὶ πάντα ἀνατρέψῃ τὰ κοινά. αἰδουμένων δ´ ἁπάντων, ἃ φρονοῦντες ἐτύγχανον, εἰς μέσον ἐκφέρειν καὶ μέχρι πολλοῦ τοῦτο ποιούντων ὁ πρεσβύτατός τε καὶ τιμιώτατος τῶν ὑπατικῶν γνώμην ἀπεδείξατο, δι´ ἧς ἀμφοτέρους ἐν ἴσῃ τιμῇ τοὺς ὑπάτους φυλάξας παρ´ αὐτῶν ἐκείνων τὸν ἐπιτηδειότερον ἄρχειν εὕρετο· ἔφη γὰρ αὑτῷ δοκεῖν, ἐπειδὴ τὸ μὲν τῆς ἀρχῆς κράτος ἥ τε βουλὴ διέγνωκε καὶ ὁ δῆμος ἐπεψήφικεν ἑνὶ δοθῆναι, δύο δὲ καταλείπεται βουλῆς καὶ φροντίδος οὐ μικρᾶς δεόμενα, τίς ὁ παραληψόμενος τὴν ἰσοτύραννον ἀρχὴν ἔσται καὶ ὑπὸ τίνος ἀποδειχθεὶς ἐξουσίας νομίμου, ἐκ τῶν τότε ὄντων ὑπάτων τὸν ἕτερον, εἴτε παραχωρήσαντος τοῦ συνάρχοντος, εἴτε κλήρῳ λαχόντα, ἑλέσθαι Ῥωμαίων ὃν ὑπολαμβάνει κράτιστα καὶ συμφορώτατα τὰ τῆς πόλεως ἐπιτροπεύσειν. μεσοβασιλέων δ´ αὐτοῖς μηθὲν ἐν τῷ παρόντι δεῖν, οὓς ἐν ταῖς μοναρχίαις ἀποδείκνυσθαι μονογνώμονας τῶν μελλόντων ἄρξειν ἔθος ἦν, ἐχούσης τῆς πόλεως τὴν ὅσιον ἀρχήν.

[5,71] After this the leading men of the senate devoted much earnest thought to searching for the man who should be entrusted with the command. For they felt that the situation required a man both vigorous in action and of wide experience in warfare, a man, moreover, possessed of prudence and self-control, who would not be led into folly by the greatness of his power; but, above all these qualities and the others essential in good generals, a man was required who knew how to govern with firmness and would show no leniency toward the disobedient, a quality of which they then stood particularly in need. And though they observed that all the qualities they demanded were to be found in Titus Larcius, one of the consuls (for Cloelius, who excelled in all administrative virtues, was not a man of action nor fond of war, nor had he the ability to command others and to inspire fear, but was a mild punisher of the disobedient), they were nevertheless ashamed to deprive one of the consuls of the magistracy of which he was legally possessed and to confer upon the other the power of both, a power which was being created greater than the kingly authority. Besides, they were under some secret apprehensions lest Cloelius, taking to heart his removal from office and considering (p217) it a dishonour put upon him by the senate, might change his sentiments and, becoming a patron of the people, overthrow the whole government. And when all were ashamed to lay their thoughts before the senate, and this situation had continued for a considerable time, at last the oldest and most honoured of the men of consular rank delivered an opinion by which he preserved an equal share of honour to both the consuls and yet found out from those men themselves the one who was the more suitable to command. He said that, since the senate had decreed and the people in confirm thereof had voted that the power of this magistracy should be entrusted to a single person, and since two matters remained that required no small deliberation and thought, namely, who should be the one to receive this magistracy that was of equal power with a tyranny, and by what legal authority he should be appointed, it was his opinion that one of the present consuls, either by consent of his colleague or by recourse to the lot, should choose among all the Romans the person he thought would govern the commonwealth in the best and most advantageous manner. They had no need on the present occasion, he said, of interreges, to whom it had been customary under the monarchy to give the sole power of appointing those who were to reign, since the commonwealth was already provided with the lawful magistrate.