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Denys d'Halicarnasse, Les Antiquités romaines, livre III

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[3,23] Ὁ δὲ Ῥωμαίων βασιλεὺς ἐνιαύσιον διαλιπὼν χρόνον, ἐν ᾧ πάντα τὰ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἐπιτήδεια παρεσκευάσατο, στρατὸν ἐξάγειν ἐπὶ τὴν Φιδηναίων πόλιν ἔγνω προφάσεις τοῦ πολέμου ποιησάμενος, ὅτι κληθέντες εἰς ἀπολογίαν περὶ τῆς ἐπιβουλῆς, ἣν συνεστήσαντο κατὰ Ῥωμαίων τε καὶ Ἀλβανῶν, οὐχ ὑπήκουσαν, ἀλλ´ εὐθὺς ἀναλαβόντες τὰ ὅπλα καὶ τὰς πύλας κλείσαντες Οὐιεντανῶν τε συμμαχίαν ἐπαγόμενοι ἐκ τοῦ φανεροῦ ἀφειστήκεσαν καὶ τοῖς παραγενομένοις ἐκ Ῥώμης πρεσβευταῖς πυνθανομένοις τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς ἀποστάσεως ἀπεκρίναντο μηδὲν αὐτοῖς ἔτι πρᾶγμα πρὸς τὴν Ῥωμαίων πόλιν εἶναι κοινόν, ἐξ οὗ Ῥωμύλος ὁ βασιλεὺς αὐτῶν ἐτελεύτησε, πρὸς ὃν ἐποιήσαντο τὰ περὶ τῆς φιλίας ὅρκια. ταύτας δὴ τὰς προφάσεις λαβὼν τήν τε οἰκείαν καθώπλιζε δύναμιν καὶ τὰς παρὰ τῶν συμμάχων μετεπέμπετο. πλεῖστον δὲ καὶ κράτιστον ἐπικουρικὸν ἐκ τῆς Ἀλβανῶν πόλεως Μέττιος Φουφέττιος ἧκεν ἄγων ὅπλοις κεκοσμημένον ἐκπρεπέσιν, ὥστε πάσας ὑπερβαλέσθαι τὰς συμμαχικὰς δυνάμεις. ὁ μὲν οὖν Τύλλος ὡς ἐκ προθυμίας τε καὶ ἀπὸ παντὸς τοῦ βελτίστου κοινωνεῖν ἐγνωκότα τοῦ πολέμου τὸν Μέττιον ἐπῄνει καὶ πάντων ἐποιεῖτο τῶν βουλευμάτων συνίστορα· ὁ δὲ ἀνὴρ οὗτος ἐν αἰτίαις παρὰ τοῖς πολίταις ὑπάρχων ὡς κακῶς ἐστρατηγηκὼς τὸν πόλεμον, καὶ δὴ καὶ εἰς προδοσίαν διαβαλλόμενος, ἐπειδὴ τρίτον ἔτος ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτοκράτορος ἀρχῆς διέμενε Τύλλου κελεύσαντος, οὐκ ἀξιῶν τε ἀρχὴν ἔχειν ἑτέρας ἀρχῆς ὑπήκοον οὐδὲ ὑποτάττεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ οὐκ αὐτὸς ἡγεῖσθαι πρᾶγμά τι ἐπεβούλευσεν ἀνόσιον. διαπρεσβευσάμενος γὰρ κρύφα πρὸς τοὺς Ῥωμαίων πολεμίους ἐνδοιαστῶς ἔτι πρὸς τὴν ἀπόστασιν ἔχοντας ἐπῆρεν αὐτοὺς μὴ κατοκνεῖν, ὡς αὐτὸς συνεπιθησόμενος Ῥωμαίοις ἐν τῷ ἀγῶνι, καὶ ταῦτα πράττων τε καὶ διανοούμενος ἅπαντας ἐλάνθανε. Τύλλος δ´ ἐπειδὴ παρεσκευάσατο τήν τ´ οἰκείαν καὶ τὴν συμμαχικὴν δύναμιν ἐξῆγεν ἐπὶ τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ διαβὰς τὸν Ἀνίητα ποταμὸν οὐ μακρὰν τῆς Φιδήνης κατεστρατοπέδευσεν. εὑρὼν δὲ πρὸ τῆς πόλεως στρατιὰν ἐκτεταγμένην πολλὴν αὐτῶν τε Φιδηναίων καὶ τῶν συμμαχούντων αὐτοῖς ἐκείνην μὲν τὴν ἡμέραν ἡσυχίαν ἔσχε, τῇ δ´ ἑξῆς Φουφέττιόν τε μεταπεμψάμενος τὸν Ἀλβανὸν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων φίλων τοὺς ἀναγκαιοτάτους ἐσκόπει μετ´ ἐκείνων τίνα χρηστέον εἴη τῷ πολέμῳ τρόπον, καὶ ἐπειδὴ πᾶσιν ἔδοξε μάχην τίθεσθαι διαταχέων καὶ μὴ τρίβειν τὸν χρόνον, χώραν καὶ τάξιν, ἣν ἕκαστος ἔμελλεν ἕξειν, προειπὼν ἡμέραν τε ὁρίσας τῆς μάχης τὴν κατόπιν διέλυσε τὸν σύλλογον. ὁ δὲ Ἀλβανὸς Φουφέττιος (ἦν γὰρ δὴ ἔτι ἄδηλος καὶ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ φίλων πολλοῖς προδοσίαν μηχανώμενος) συγκαλέσας τοὺς ἐπιφανεστάτους Ἀλβανῶν λοχαγοὺς καὶ ταξιάρχους λέγει πρὸς αὐτοὺς τοιάδε· Ἄνδρες ταξίαρχοι καὶ λοχαγοί, πράγματα μέλλω ἐς ὑμᾶς μεγάλα καὶ ἀπροσδόκητα ἐκφέρειν, ἃ τέως ἔκρυπτον, ἱκετεύω δὲ ὑμᾶς ἀπόρρητα ποιήσασθαι, εἰ μή με διεργάσεσθε, καὶ ἐὰν δόξῃ συνοίσειν ἐπιτελῆ γενόμενα συλλαβέσθαι μοι αὐτῶν. πολλὰ μὲν οὖν λέγειν ὁ καιρὸς οὐκ ἐπιτρέπει βραχὺς ὤν, αὐτὰ δὲ τὰ ἀναγκαιότατα ἐρῶ. ἐγὼ πάντα τὸν μεταξὺ χρόνον ἐξ οὗ Ῥωμαίοις ὑπετάχθημεν ἕως τῆςδε τῆς ἡμέρας αἰσχύνης μεστὸν καὶ ὀδύνης ἔχων τὸν βίον διατετέλεκα καίτοι τιμηθείς γε ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως αὐτῶν τῇ αὐτοκράτορι ἀρχῇ, ἣν τρίτον ἔτος ἤδη τοῦτο ἔχω καὶ εἰ βουλοίμην μέχρι παντὸς ἕξω. ἀλλὰ πάντων ἡγούμενος εἶναι κακῶν ἔσχατον ἐν οὐκ εὐτυχοῦσι τοῖς κοινοῖς μόνος εὐτυχεῖν, ἐνθυμούμενος δὲ ὅτι παρὰ πάντα τὰ νενομισμένα παρ´ ἀνθρώποις ὅσια τὴν ἡγεμονίαν ὑπ´ αὐτῶν ἀφῃρέθημεν, ἐσκόπουν ὅπως ἂν αὐτὴν ἀνακομισαίμεθα μηδεμιᾶς πειραθέντες μεγάλης συμφορᾶς· πολλοὺς δὲ καὶ παντοδαποὺς λογισμοὺς λαμβάνων μίαν εὕρισκον ὁδὸν ἄγουσαν ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα ῥᾴστην τε καὶ ἀκινδυνοτάτην, εἴ τις αὐτοῖς ἀνασταίη πόλεμος ἐκ τῶν πλησιοχώρων πόλεων. εἰς γὰρ τοῦτον ὑπελάμβανον αὐτοὺς καθισταμένους συμμάχων δεήσεσθαι καὶ πρώτων γε ἡμῶν. τὸ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο οὐ πολλῆς ὑπελάμβανον ὑμῖν διδαχῆς δεήσειν, ὅτι κάλλιόν τε καὶ δικαιότερον περὶ τῆς ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἐλευθερίας μᾶλλον ἢ περὶ τῆς Ῥωμαίων ἡγεμονίας ποιήσασθαι τὸν ἀγῶνα. ταῦτα διανοηθεὶς ὑπενόμευσα Ῥωμαίοις πόλεμον ἐκ τῶν ὑπηκόων Οὐιεντανοὺς καὶ Φιδηναίους πείσας ἐπὶ τὰ ὅπλα χωρεῖν, ὡς συλληψόμενος αὐτοῖς τοῦ πολέμου. καὶ μέχρι τούτου λέληθα Ῥωμαίους ταῦτα πράττων καὶ ταμιευόμενος ἐμαυτῷ τὸν τῆς ἐπιθέσεως καιρόν· ἐν ᾧ σκέψασθε ὅσα ὠφεληθησόμεθα. πρῶτον μὲν οὐκ ἐν φανερῷ βουλεύσαντες ἀπόστασιν, ἐν ᾧ κίνδυνος ἦν καθ´ ἑκάτερον ἢ ἀπαρασκεύους ἐπειχθέντας καὶ τῇ οἰκείᾳ δυνάμει μόνῃ πιστεύσαντας τὸν ὑπὲρ ἁπάντων ἀναρρῖψαι κύβον, ἢ παρασκευαζομένους καὶ βοηθείας ἐγείραντας ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν παρασκευῇ ὄντων προκαταληφθῆναι, οὐδετέρου τῶν χαλεπῶν τούτων πειραθέντες τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων χρήσιμον ἕξομεν. ἔπειτα πολλὴν καὶ δυσπολέμητον οὖσαν τὴν τῶν ἀντιπάλων ἰσχὺν καὶ τύχην οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ βιαίου τρόπου πειρασόμεθα καθαιρεῖν, ἀλλ´ οἷς ἁλίσκεται πάντα τὰ ὑπέραυχα καὶ μὴ ῥᾴδια τῷ βιαίῳ καθαιρεθῆναι, δόλῳ καὶ ἀπάτῃ, οὔτε πρῶτοι ἄρξαντες αὐτῶν οὔτε μόνοι. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οὐκ ἀξιομάχῳ οὔσῃ τῇ οἰκείᾳ δυνάμει πρὸς ἅπασαν τὴν Ῥωμαίων τε καὶ τῶν συμμάχων ἰσχὺν ἀντιταχθῆναι τὴν Φιδηναίων τε καὶ Οὐιεντανῶν τοσαύτην οὖσαν ὅσην ὁρᾶτε προσειλήφαμέν τε, καὶ ὡς ἂν μάλιστα θάρσος τινὶ συμμαχίας βεβαίου τὸ ἐπικουρικὸν παράσχοι προσγενόμενον οὕτω παρεσκεύασταί μοι. οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ γῇ Φιδηναῖοι τὸν ἀγῶνα ἀράμενοι, τῆς δὲ αὑτῶν προκινδυνεύοντες ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν φυλάξουσιν. ὃ δὲ πάντων μέν ἐστιν ἥδιστον ἀνθρώποις, σπανίως δέ τισιν ἐκ τοῦ παρελθόντος αἰῶνος ἐξεγένετο, καὶ τοῦθ´ ἡμῖν ὑπάρξει· εὖ πάσχοντες ὑπὸ τῶν συμμάχων εὖ δρᾶν ἐκ

Traduction française :

[3,23] The king of the Romans, after letting a year pass, during which he made the necessary (p95) preparations for war, resolved to lead out his army against the city of the Fidenates. The grounds he alleged for the war were that this people, being called upon to justify themselves in the matter of the plot that they had formed against the Romans and Albans, had paid no heed, but immediately taking up arms, shutting their gates, and bringing in the allied forces of the Veientes, had openly revolted, and that when ambassadors arrived from Rome to inquire the reason for their revolt, they had answered that they no longer had anything in common with the Romans since the death of Romulus, their king, to whom they had sworn their oaths of friendship. Seizing on these grounds for war, Tullus was not only arming his own forces, but also sending for those of his allies. The most numerous as well as the best auxiliary troops were brought to him from Alba by Mettius Fufetius, and they were equipped with such splendid arms as to excel all the other allied forces. Tullus, therefore, believing that Mettius had been actuated by zeal and by the best motives in deciding to take part in the war, commended him and communicated to him all his plans. But this man, who was accused by his fellow citizens of having mismanaged the recent war and was furthermore charged with treason, in view of the fact that he continued in the supreme command of the city for the third year by order of Tullus, disdaining now to hold any longer a command that was subject to another's command or to be subordinated rather than himself to lead, devised an abominable plot. He sent ambassadors here and there secretly to the enemies of the Romans while they were as yet (p97) wavering in their resolution to revolt and encouraged them not to hesitate, promising that he himself would join them in attacking the Romans during the battle; and these activities and plans he kept secret from everybody. Tullus, as soon as he had got ready his own army as well as that of his allies, marched against the enemy and after crossing the river Anio encamped near Fidenae. And finding a considerable army both of the Fidenates and of their allies drawn up before the city, he lay quiet that day; but on the next he sent for Fufetius, the Alban, and the closest of his other friends and took counsel with them concerning the best method of conducting the war. And when all were in favour of engaging promptly and not wasting time, he assigned them their several posts and commands, and having fixed the next day for the battle, he dismissed the council. In the meantime Fufetius, the Alban — for his treachery was still a secret to many even of his own friends — calling together the most prominent centurions and tribunes among the Albans, addressed them as follows: "Tribunes and centurions, I am going to disclose to you important and unexpected things which I have hitherto been concealing; and I beg of you to keep them secret if you do not wish to ruin me, and to assist me in carrying them out if you think their realization will be advantageous. The present occasion does not permit of many words, as the time is short; so I shall mention only the most essential matters. I, from the time we were subordinated to the Romans up to this day, have led a life (p99) full of sham en grief, though honoured by the king with the supreme command, which I am now holding for the third year and may, if I should so desire, hold as long as I live. But regarding it as the greatest of all evils to be the only fortunate man in a time of public misfortune, and taking it to heart that, contrary to all the rights mankind look upon as sacred, we have been deprived by the Romans of our supremacy, I took thought how we might recover it without experiencing any great disaster. And although I considered many plans of every sort, the only way I could discover that promised success, and at the same time the easiest and the least dangerous one, was in hand a war should be started against them by the neighbouring states. For I assumed that when confronted by such a war they would have need of allies and particularly of us. As to the next step, I assumed that it would not require much argument to convince you that it is more glorious as well as more fitting to fight for our liberty than for the supremacy of the Romans. "With these thoughts in mind I secretly stirred up a war against the Romans on the part of their subjects, encouraging the Veientes and Fidenates to take up arms by a promise of my assistance in the war. And thus far I have escaped the Romans' notice as I contrived these things and kept in my own hands the opportune moment for the attack. Just consider now the many advantages we shall derive from this course. First, by not having openly planned a revolt, in which there would have been a double (p101) danger — either of being hurried or unprepared and of putting everything to the hazard while trusting to our own strength only, or, while we were making preparations and gathering assistance, of being forestalled by an enemy already prepared — we shall now experience neither of these difficulties but shall enjoy the advantage of both. In the next place, we shall not be attempting to destroy the great and formidable power and good fortune of our adversaries by force, but rather by those means by which every thing that is overbearing and not easy to be subdued by force is taken, namely, by guile and deceit; and we shall be neither the first nor the only people who have resorted to these means. Besides, as our own force is not strong enough to be arrayed against the whole power of the Romans and their allies, we have also added the forces of the Fidenates and the Veientes, whose great numbers you see before you; and I have taken the following precautions that these auxiliaries who have been added to our numbers may with all confidence be depended on to adhere to our alliance. For it will not be in our territory that the Fidenates will be fighting, but while they are defending their own country they will at the same time be protecting ours. Then, too, we shall have this advantage, which men look upon as the most gratifying of all and which has fallen to the lot of but few in times past, namely, that, while receiving a benefit from our allies, we shall ourselves be thought to be conferring one upon them. And if this enterprise turns out according to our wish, as (p103) is reasonable to expect, the Fidenates and the Veientes, in delivering us from a grievous subjection, will feel grateful to us, as if it were they themselves who had received this favour at our hands. "These are the preparations which I have made after much thought and which I regard as sufficient to inspire you with the courage and zeal to revolt. Now hear from me the manner in which I have planned to carry out the undertaking. Tullus has assigned me my post under the hill and has given me the command of one of the wings. When we are about to engage the enemy, I will break ranks and begin to lead up the hill; and you will then follow me with your companies in their proper order. When I have gained the top of the hill am securely posted, hear in what manner I shall handle the situation after that. If I find my plans turning out according to my wish, that is, if I see that the enemy has become emboldened through confidence in our assistance, and the Romans disheartened and terrified, in the belief that they have been betrayed by us, and contemplating, as they likely will, flight rather than fight, I will fall upon them and cover the field with the bodies of the slain, since I shall be rushing down hill from higher ground and shall be attacking with a courageous and orderly force men who are frightened and dispersed. For a terrible thing in warfare is the sudden impression, even though ill-grounded, of the treachery of allies or of an attack by fresh enemies, and we know that many great armies in the past have been utterly destroyed by no other kind of terror so much as by an impression for which there was no ground. But in our case it will be no vain report, no unseen terror, (p105) but a deed more dreadful than anything ever seen or experienced. If, however, I find that the contrary of my calculations is in fact coming to pass (for mention must be made also of those things which are wont to happen contrary to human expectations, since our lives bring us many improbable experiences as well), I too shall then endeavour to do the contrary of what I have just proposed. For I shall lead you against the enemy in conjunction with the Romans and shall share with them the victory, pretending that I occupied the heights with the intention of surrounding the foes drawn up against me; and my claim will seem credible, since I shall have made my actions agree with my explanation. Thus, without sharing in the dangers of either side, we shall have a part in the good fortune of both. "I, then, have determined upon these measures, and with the assistance of the gods I shall carry them out, as being the most advantageous, not only to the Albans, but also to the rest of the Latins. It is your part, in the first place, to observe secrecy, and next, to maintain good order, to obey promptly the orders you shall receive, to fight zealously yourselves and to infuse the same zeal into those who are under your command, remembering that we are not contending for liberty upon the same terms as other people, who have been accustomed to obey others and who have received that form of government from their ancestors. For we are freemen descended from freemen, and to us our ancestors have handed down the tradition of holding sway over our neighbours as a mode of life preserved by them for someone five hundred years; of which let us not deprive our posterity. And let none of you entertain (p107) the fear that by showing a will to do this he will be breaking a compact and violating the oaths by which it was confirmed; on the contrary, let him consider that he will be restoring to its original force the compact which the Romans have violated, a compact far from unimportant, but one which human nature has established and the universal law of both Greeks and barbarians confirms, namely, that fathers shall rule over and give just commands to their children, and mother-cities to their colonies. This compact, which is forever inseparable from human nature, is not being violated by us, who demand that it shall always remain in force, and none of the gods or lesser divinities will be wroth with us, as guilty of an impious action, if we resent being slaves to our own posterity; but it is being violated by those who have broken it from the beginning and have attempted by an impious act to set up the law of man above that of Heaven. And it is reasonable to expect that the anger of the gods will be directed against them rather than against us, and that the indignation of men will fall upon them rather than upon us. 1If, therefore, you all believe that these plans will be the most advantageous, let us pursue them, calling the gods and other divinities to our assistance. But if any one of you is minded to the contrary and either believes that we ought never to recover the ancient dignity of our city, or, while awaiting a more favourable opportunity, favours deferring our undertaking for the present, let him not hesitate to propose his thoughts to the assembly. For we shall follow whatever plan meets with your unanimous approval."





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